S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS II.

De simplicitate Dei.
ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 164-167.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Eademque sola proprie ac vere simplex est etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.[9]

Supra ostendit Magister duas proprietates divinae essentiae, scilicet veritatem et incommutabilitatem; hic ostendit simplicitatem divinae essentiae vel naturae. Et habet haec pars tres partes. In *prima* ostendit, quod *proprie* est simplex; in *secunda*, quod *vere*, ibi: *Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat / Augustinus* etc.

[9] In hac distinctione divisio textus partis II. in codd. hoc loco ponitur, dum alibi coniungitur cum divisione partis I. Cfr. ultima verba in divisione partis I. p. 150.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART II

On the simplicity of God.
ARTICLE SOLE

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 164-167.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

And the Same alone is properly and truly simple etc.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT[9]

Above Master (Peter) shows the two properties of the Divine Essence, that is truth and incommutability; here he shows the simplicity of the Divine Essence and/or Nature. And this part has three parts. In the *first* he shows, that *properly (speaking)* He is simple; in the *second*, that (His is) *truly* (simple), there (where he says): *Here it must be diligently noted, since Augustine / says* etc.

[9] In this distinction the division of the text of part II is placed in this position in the codices, while in others it is conjoined with the division of part I. Cf. the final words in the division of part I., p. 150.

Augtustinus etc. In *tertia*, quod *summe*, ibi: *Huius autem sinceritatis et simplicitatis*.

when Augustine / says etc.. In *the third*, that (He is) *most highly* (simple), there (where he says): *Moreover of this sincerity and simplicity* etc..

Prima iterum pars habet tres partes. Primo proponit, quod proprie est simplex; secundo ostendit, quod non convenit naturae corporali, ibi: *Ut autem scias, quomodo simplex* etc. In tertia, quod non convenit naturae spirituali, ibi: *Creatura quoque spiritualis* etc.[1]

Again the *first* part has three parts. First he proposes, that properly (speaking) He is simple; second he shows, that (simplicity) does not convene with corporal nature, there (where he says): *But so that you may know, in what manner that Substance be simple* etc.. In the third, that it does not convene with spiritual nature, there (where he says): *A spiritual creature too* etc..[1]

Similiter pars, in qua ostendit, quod est *vere* simplex, habet tres partes. In prima ostendit, quod in Deo est pure multiplicitas nominum; in secundo ostendit, quod in eo non est diversitas praedicamentorum, ibi: *Quod autem in natura divinitatis nulla sit accidentium* etc. In tertia concludit, quod nomina praedicamentorum in divinis non possunt dici proprie, et etiam nomen primi praedicamenti, ibi: *Unde nec proprie dicitur substantia*.

Similarly the part, in which he shows, that He is *truly* simply, has three parts. In the first he shows, that in God there is purely a multiplicity of names; in the second he shows, that in Him there is not a diversity of predicaments, there (where he says): *Moreover that in the Nature of the Divinity there is no diversity of accidents* etc.. In the third he concludes, that the names of the predicaments among the divine cannot be spoken properly, and even the name of the first predicament, there (where he says): *Whence neither is He properly said (to be) a substance.*

Similiter pars,[2] in qua ostendit, quod est *summe* simplex, habet tres. Primo enim ostendit, quod tanta est ibi simplicitas, quod nulla est ibi rerum diversitas; secundo, quod cum hac simplicitate stat personarum pluralitas, ibi: *Et cum tantae simplicitatis* etc. Tertia vero et ultimo epilogat, quod ostensa est in divina essentia triplex proprietas, ibi: *Ecce quanta identitas*.

Similarly the part,[2] in which he shows, that He is *most highly* simple, has three (parts). For first he shows, that there is so great a simplicity There, that there is no diversity of things There; second, that with this simplicity there stands a plurality of Persons, there (where he says): *And though the Divine Nature is of so great a simplicity* etc.. However, third and lastly he concludes commenting [epilogat], that there has been shown in the Divine Essence a threefold property, there (where he says): *Behold how great is the identity*.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicit Magister in littera, quatuor quaeruntur in parte ista.[3]

For an understanding of those things which Master (Peter says) in the text, four (questions) are asked in this part.[3]

Primo quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit summa simplicitas.

First there is asked, whether in God there is a most high simplicity.

Secundo, utrum simplicitas sit Dei proprietas.

Tertio, propter illud quod dicitur in littera de anima rationali, quaeritur, utrum anima rationalis sit in toto corpore, ita quod in qualibet parte.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere.

Second, whether simplicity is a property of God.

Third, on account of that which is said in the text concerning the rational soul, there is asked, whether the rational soul is in the whole body, so that (it be) in any part.

Fourth there is asked, whether God is in any determinate genus.

Quaestio I.

Utrum Deus sit summe simplex.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod in Deo sit summa simplicitas, sic probatur.

1. Omne primum est simplicissimum, quia quanto aliquod prius, tanto simplicius;[4] sed Deus est primum in genere entium, eo quod nec est nec esse potest nec cogitari prius: ergo est ita simplex, quod ipso nihil simplicius esse potest vel cogitari: ergo est simplicissimum.

2. Item, omne quod est quidquid habet, est simplicissimum;[5] sed Deus est quidquid habet: ergo etc. Prima patet in se. *Minor* probatur sic: Deus habet potentiam, sapientiam, et sic de aliis; aut ergo est sua potentia, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum. Si non est sua potentia, cum sit potens potentia, habet posse ab alio, ergo Deus est ab alio; quod si hoc est falsum; ergo illud ex quo sequitur.

3. Item, in esse nobilissimo debet omnis conditio nobilitatis poni in summo; sed Deus est ens nobilissimum, et simplicitas est conditio nobilitatis: ergo ponenda est in Deo in summo: ergo Deus est summe simplex.

Question 1

Whether God is most highly simple.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that in God there is a most high simplicity, it is thus proved:

1. Every first is the most simple, because by as much as something (is) first, by so much (is it) more simple;[4] but God is the First in the genus of beings [in genere entium], for the reason that neither is there nor can there be nor (can there) be thought one more first: therefore He is so simple, that nothing more simple can be and/or be thought than He: therefore He is the most simple.

2. Likewise, everything which is whatever it has, is most simple;[5] but God is whatever He has ergo etc.. The first is clear in itself. The *minor* is proven thus: God has potency, wisdom, and likewise concerning the other (perfections); therefore either He is His own potency, or not. If so, I have (proven) the proposed. If He is not His own potency, since He is potent in potency, He has to be able by another, therefore God is by another; which if this is false; therefore (so also) that from which it follows.

3. Likewise, in the most noble "being" every condition of nobility ought to be posited in the highest (manner); but God is the most noble Being [ens], and simplicity is the condition of nobility; therefore it is to be posited in God in the highest (manner); therefore God is most highly simple.

4. Item, quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto est potentius in virtue, et e converso, quia « virtus unita plus potest quam multiplicata »;[6] sed Deus est infinitus et immensus virtute: ergo est infinitus simplicitate: ergo in Deo est summa simplicitas.

4. Likewise, by as much as something is more simple, by so much is it more potent in virtue, and conversely, because « virtue can be more united than multiplied »;[6] but God is infinite and immense in virtue; therefore He is infinite in simplicity; therefore in God there is the most high Simplicity.

Contra: 1. Simplicius cogitatur aliquid, cum cogitatur ut abstractum a pluribus, quam quod[7] cogitatur ut contentum in pluribus; ergo cum fides nostra cogitet Deum ut in pluribus, non cogitat eum ut simplicissimum: ergo si fides vere cogitat, Deus non est simplicissimus.

On the contrary: 1. Something is thought more simple, when it is thought as one abstracted from very many, rather than because[7] it is thought as one contained in very many; therefore since our Faith thinks of God as in very many, it does not think of Him as the most simple; therefore if faith thinks truly, God is not the most simple.

2. Item, maior est simplicitas, ubi est identitas sine diversitate, quam cum diversitate; sed in Deo est identitas cum diversitate suppositorum: ergo in Deo non est summa simplicitas.

2. Likewise, there is greater simplicity, where there is identity without diversity, than when with diversity; but in God there is identity with diversity of supposits: therefore in God there is not a most high simplicity.

3. Item, maior est simplicitas, ubi est unitas sine pluralitate;[8] quia numerus dicit aliquo modo compositionem, respectu cuius unitas est simplex: ergo cum in Deo sit unitas cum pluralitate personarum, patet etc.

3. Likewise, there is a greater simplicity, where there is unity without plurality (than with plurality);[8] because number means in some manner a composition, in respect of which there is a simple unity: therefore since in God there is unity with a plurality of Persons, it is clear that etc..

4. Item, maior est simplicitas, ubi non tantum subiectum, sed etiam proprietas est eadem cum proprietate;[9] quia, quando proprietas differt a proprietate in uno, sunt plura differentia: ergo non est simplex; sed in divinis personis in eadem persona

4. Likewise, there is a greater simplicity, where not only subject, but also property is the same with property (, than where they differ);[9] because, when property differs from property in one (manner), they are more according to difference: therefore it is not simple; but among the Divine Persons, in the same Person

---

[1] Cod. I addit: *Et primo per rationem communem, et secundo per propriam, ibi: Nihil enim simplex*.
[2] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 praemittit *tertia*.
[3] Fide omnium mss. et ed. 1 restituimus verba *in parte ista*.
[4] Cfr. Arisot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.). — Paulo infra post *prius* cod. O adiungit *eo*.
[5] Boeth., de Hebdomad. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *sed*. — De hoc argumento vide August., XI. de Civ. Dei., c. 10. et Boeth., de Trin., c. 2.
[6] Libr. de Causis., prop. 17. — In princ. huius

---

[1] Codex I adds: *And first by a common reckoning, and second by a proper one, there (where he says): For nothing simple*. [Trans. note: In the quote which ends the previous paragraph the actual text of Master Peter alluded to is *Moreover of this Essence there is so great a sincerity and simplicity* etc., ibid., ch. 8.]
[2] The Vatican manuscript contrary to very many codices and to edition 1 prefixes *third* [tertiam].
[3] Trusting in all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored the words *in this part* [in parte ista].
[4] Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 1 (Bk. X, ch.

argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc bis omittit *est*, quod tamen in aliis codd. et ed. 1 habetur. Cod. M post *simplicius* bene addit *in essentia*.
[7] Aliqui codd. ut H ee ff cum ed. 1 forte melius *cum* loco *quod*. Mox pauci codd. ut H V ee *concretum* pro *contentum*.
[8] Supple cum cod. Z *quam cum pluralitate* vel cum cod. *quam ubi non*.
[9] Subaudi cum cod. Z: *quam ubi differunt* vel cum codd. Q bb: *quam quando proprietas differt a proprietate*.

1.) — A little below this after *more first* [prius] codex O adds *than He* [eo].
[5] Boethius, On Weeks. — Then trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *but* [sed]. — Concerning this argument see (St.) Augustine, The City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 10, and Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2.
[6] The book On Causes, proposition 17. — In the beginning of this argument, the Vatican edition with codex cc twice omits *is (it)* [est], which however is found in the other codices and in edition 1. Codex M after *more simple* [simplicius] adds well *in essence* [in essentia].
[7] Other codices such as H ee and ff together with edition 1 read perhaps better *when* [cum] in place of *because* [quod]. Then a few codices such as H V and ee read *concretized* [concretum] for *contained* [contentum].
[8] Supply with codex Z *than with plurality* and/or with codices I *than where there (is) not*.
[9] Understand with codex Z: *, than where they differ* or with codices Q and bb: *than when property differs from property.*

---

p. 166

differt proprietas a proprietate, unde innascibilitas differt a parternitate: ergo etc.

property differs from property, wherefore innascibility differs from paternity: therefore etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Summa simplicitas est in Deo.

CONCLUSION

The highest simplicity is in God.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod sicut primae rationes probant, in Deo ponenda est summa simplicitas.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that just as the first reasons prove, there is to be posited in God the highest Simplicity.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod fides non intelligit ipsum ut simplicissimum; dicendum, quod fides[1] intelligit eum ut simplicissimum, et qui aliter intelligit, non intelligit ut summe simplex. Quod patet sic: quoniam est intelligere unum in uno, et unum in pluribus multiplicatum, et unum in pluribus non multiplicatum. Simplicius autem intelligitur unum in pluribus esse multiplicatum, quam unum in uno; quod patet, quia universale est simplicius singulari;[2] et adhuc multo simplicius intelligitur, quod est unum in pluribus non multiplicatum. Hoc[3] modo intelligit fides nostra Deum. Et ideo simplicior est Deus, quia est in omnibus[4] non multiplicatus,

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the Faith does not understand Him as the utmost Simple; it must be said, that the Faith[1] does understand Him as the most Simple, and who understands Him otherwise, does not understand Him as most highly simple. Which is clear in this manner: since there is an understanding of a one in one, and of a one multiplied into the very many, and of a one not multiplied in very many. Moreover, it is more simply understood that a one has been multiplied into very many, than that a one (is) in a one; which is clear, because the universal is more simple than the singular;[2] and still it is much more simply understood, that there is a one not multiplied in very

quam si esset in uno solo, vel in pluribus mulitiplicatus. Hinc est, quod Deus simplicissimus est, et fides nostra eum ut simplicissimum intelligit.

many. In[3] this manner our Faith understands God. And for that reason God is more simple, because He is in All (the Persons)[4] the One not-multiplied, than if He were in One alone, and/or as One multiplied in the More. Hence it is, that God is the most Simple, and (that) our Faith understands Him as the most Simple.

Et qui intelligit Deum[5] plurificatum in essentia, vel unum in supposito, derogat *summae* simplicitati eius, dergoat etiam *nobilitati* simplicitatis[6] eius. Quoniam ubi *summa* simplicitas intelligitur, oportet summam actualitatem intelligi, si summe *nobilis* est. Et ubi est summa actualitas, summa diffusio et communicatio debet poni; et ista non potest esse nisi in sempiterna productione rei omnino infinitae et aequalis in virtue; et hoc non potest esse in alietate[7] essentiae; ergo non potest intelligi divina essentia simplicissima, nisi in tribus personis intelligatur tota esse, quarum una sit ab alia.

And he who understands God[5] as plurified in essence, and/or as One in supposit, derogates from His *most high* Simplicity, derogates also from the *nobility* of His simplicity.[6] Since where there is understood (to be) a *most high* simplicity, it is proper that there be understood a most high actuality, if it is most highly *noble*. And where there is a most high actuality, there ought to be posited a most high diffusion and communication; and that cannot be except in the sempiternal production of a Thing [rei] entirely infinite and equal in virtue; and this cannot be in an otherness[7] of essence; therefore the Divine Essence cannot be understood as the most Simple, unless it be understood to be wholly in three Persons, One of Whom is from an Other [ab alio].

Quando ergo obiicitur, quod simplicius est abstractum a pluribus quam[8] in pluribus; verum est, si in illis pluribus plurificetur. Si autem non plurificatur, non est verum.

Therefore when it is objected, that the more simple has been abstracted from [a] the very many rather than[8] in the very many; it is true, if it is plurified in those very many. If, however, it is not plurified, it is not true.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est simplicitas, ubi nulla diversitas; dicendum quod diversitas dupliciter potest venire: vel ex *additione*, vel ex *origine*. Ex *additione*, cum est diversitas in proprietatibus absolutis, quae diversae sunt in diversis, ut albedo in Petro et nigredo in[9] Paulo; et haec privat simplicitatem, quia ponit compositionem. Est alia diversitas veniens ex *sola origine*, ut puta, quia una persona emanat[10] ab alia, differt ab ea; et haec non repugnat simplicitati, quia nullam ponit compositionem, sed solum ordinem et respectum ad alium; et haec[11] non proprie dicitur diversitas, sed distinctio et discretio. Et hoc manifestum est, si intelligamus, Patrem se ipso generare Filium, et intelligamus, eum generare et iterum non

2. To that which is objected, that there is greater simplicity, where (there is) no diversity; it must be said, that diversity can come about [venire] in a twofold manner: out of *addition*, and/or out of *origin*. Out of *addition*, when there is diversity in absolute properties, which are diverse in diverse (things), as whiteness in Peter and blackness in[9] Paul; and this strips away [privat] simplicity, because it posits composition. There is another diversity coming out of an *sole origin*, as suppose, because one Person emanates[10] from an Other, He differs from the other; and this is not repugnant to simplicity, because it posits no composition, but only an order to and a regard for an Other; and this[11] is not properly said (to be) a diversity, but (rather)

generare, nulla est hic compositio, quia nulla additio.

a distinction and discretion. And this is manifest, if we understand, that the Father by His very Self generates the Son, and understand, that He generates and does not generate again, (then) here there is no composition, because (there is) no addition.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod major est simplicitas, ubi nulla pluralitas; dicendum, quod duplex est pluralitas. *Quaedam*, in qua plus est in duobus quam in uno, ut in duobus hominibus plus est de bonitate quam in uno; et ista pluralitas repugnat simplicitati, quia unitas addit supra unitatem. *Quaedam* autem est pluralitas, in qua tantum in pluribus est, quantum in uno; et haec est in divinis, quia tantum de esse et bonitate et virtute est in una persona, quantum in plurbus; et ista pluralitas nihil addit ad unitatem; et ideo nullam omnino ponit compositionem nec privat simplicitatem.

3. To that which is objected, that there is greater simplicity, where (there is) no plurality; it must be said, that plurality is twofold. A *certain one*, in which more is in two than in one, as in two men there is more of goodness [plus de bonitate] than in one; and that plurality is repugnant to simplicity, because unity adds to unity. Moreover there is a *certain* plurality, in which as much as is in the very many, so much (is) in the one; and this is in divine (things), because as much "being" [tantum de esse] according to both goodness and virtue is in one Person, as (is) in the More; and that plurality adds nothing to the Unity; and for that reason it posits entirely no composition nor does it strip away simplicity.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Patre differt proprietas a proprietate; dicendum, quod proprietas differt a propretate tripliciter: aut respectu subiecti, aut respectu sui, aut respectu obiecti. Si respectu *subiecti*, quia causantur ex diversis naturis[12] in ipso repertis; sic ponit compositionem, quia ponit subiectum esse ex[13] pluribus. Si respectu *sui*, sic differt musica et grammatica in Petro; et sic ponit similiter compositionem, quia ponit subiectum subesse pluribus. Si respectu *obiecti*, sic ponit subiectum comparari pluribus; et ex hoc[14] non ponitur compositio, sed distinctio. Exemplum est in puncto, quod est principium et finis respectu diversarum linearum. Hoc modo est differentia proprietatum in divinis.

4. To that which is objected, that in the Father property differs from property; it must be said, that property differs from property in a threefold manner: either in respect of the subject, or in respect of itself, or in respect of the object. If in respect of the *subject*, because they are caused from diverse natures[12] discovered in Himself; thus it posits composition, because it posits that the subject is out of[13] very many. If in respect of *itself*, in the same manner as music and grammar differ in Peter; thus it also similarly posits composition, because it posits that the subject is under very many. If in respect of the *object*, it thus posits that the subject is compared to very many; and from this[14] there is not posited a composition, but (rather) a distinction. An example (of this) is in the point, which is the beginning and end in respect of diverse lines. In this manner there is a difference of properties among the Divine (Persons).

---

[1] Codd. inter se non conveiunt; plures enim ut F H I N P Q R U cum ed. 1 loco *fides* habent *immo*, alii ut C L O Z *bene*, alii ut A T aa legunt *quod ipsum intelligit ut*, alii demum, sicut Vaticana et ad. nostra.
[2] Cfr. Aristot., I Poster. c. 20. (c. 24.).

[1] The codices do not agree among themselves, for very many such as F H I N P Q R U together with edition 1 in place of *the Faith* [fides] have *nay rather it* [immo], others such as C L O Z *it well* [bene], others such as A T and aa read *because it*

[3] Plures codd. ut E I P Q X Z cum ed. 1 addunt *autem*.
[4] Hoc est, in tribus personis divinis; aliqui codd. ut H I Z cum ed. 1 *pluribus* pro *omnibus*, quae lectio in se praeferenda videtur.
[5] Cod. Y adiungit *vel*.
[6] Supplevimus ope vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 minus bene omissum *simplicitatis*.
[7] Cod. Z *nisi in identitate* pro *in alietate.*
[8] Supple: contentum, vel cum cod. H *contractum.*
[9] Auctoritate multorum mss. ut E H K M P Q U V Z etc et ed. 1 adiecimus *et nigredo in*, quod et contextus postulare videtur. Vat. cum cod. cc contra alios codd. et ed. 1 post *Paulo* addit *et Gregorio*.
[10] Ex antiquioribus mss. ed ed. 1 substituimus *emanat* loco *emanans*.
[11] Faventibus pluribus mss. ut A I T etc. et ed. 1 nec non contextu, reposuimus *haec* pro *hoc.* Cod. V *hoc modo*. Paulo ante cod. O *aliam* loco *alium*.
[12] Codd. aa bb addunt *vel principiis*.
[13] Praeferimus lectionem multuorum mss. ut H I K L O T X Z aa bb etc. *ex* pro *in*, quae et contextu confirmatur.
[14] Vat. *hoc modo* pro *ex hoc*, sed obstat auctoritas antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1.

understands Him as [quod ipsum intelligit ut], finally others, as the Vatican and our edition (read as above).
[2] Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, ch. 20 (ch. 24).
[3] Very many codices such as E I P Q X Z with edition 1 add *Moreover* [autem].
[4] That is, in three Divine Persons; other codices such as H I and Z together with edition 1 have *More* [pluribus] for *all* [omnibus], which reading in itself seems to be preferred.
[5] Codex Y adds vel [trans. note: to introduce the pair *as plurified ... and/or as One...*etc.; in this usage the first vel is omitted in translation and the second is rendered *and/or*].
[6] We have supplied with the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1 less well omitted *simplicity* [simplicitatis].
[7] Codex Z reads *except in an identity* [nisi in identitate] in place of *in an otherness* [in alietate].
[8] Supply: "contained," or with codex H *contracted* [contractum].
[9] On the authority of many manuscripts such as E H K M P Q U V Z etc. and edition 1 we have added *and blackness in* [et nigredo in], which the context also seems to require. The Vatican manuscript together with codex. cc, contrary to the other codices and edition 1, adds *and Gregory* [et Gregorio] after *in Paul* [in Paulo].
[10] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *emanates* [emanat] in place of *emanating* [emanans].
[11] With very many of the manuscripts, such as A I T etc, and edition 1, not without the context (favoring it), we have replaced *this* [hoc] with *this* [haec]. Codex V reads *in this manner* [hoc modo]. A little before this codex O reads *another (Person)* [aliam] in place of *an Other* [alium]. [Trans. Note: a little further *discretion* rather than *division*, because the Persons of the Trinity are perfectly distinct and perfectly united in the One Essence, and hence there is no division: for this reason the English *division* which could normally translate the Latin *discretio* is here replaced by the neologism *discretion*.]
[12] Codices aa and bb add *and/or principles* [vel principiis].
[13] We prefer the reading of many of the manuscripts such as H I K L O T X Z aa and bb etc., *out of* [ex] in place of *in* [in], which is also confirmed by the context.
[14] The Vatican manuscript reads *in this manner* [hoc modo] for *from this* [ex hoc], but this withstands the authority of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.

---

p. 167

SCHOLION.

I. Simplicitas dicit modum quendam unitatis nobilissium, et simplicitas divina summam simul actualitatem. Distinguitur hic et in sequenti questione id quod est *simplicter* simplex, et quod est *summe* simplex.

SCHOLIUM.

I. Simplicity means a certain, most noble manner of unity, and divine simplicity (means) a simultaneous most high actuality. Distinguished here and in the following question is that which is *simply* simple, and

Primum invenitur etiam in creaturis, et est illud quod non est resolubile in partes essentiales sive constitutivas; sic et materia prima per ablationem omnis actus et perfectionis dicitur simplex. *Summa* vero simplicitas excludit qualemcumque compositionem, tam *activam* sive compositionem *ex* aliis, quam *passiva* sive compositionem *cum* aliis. Haec summa simplicitas certe importat non tantum privationem compositonis, sed etiam « modum unitatis nobilissimum, quem Deus nulli communicat creaturae » (q. seq. ad 1.).

that which is *most highly* simple. The first is found also in creatures, and is that which is not resolvable into essential or constitutive parts; thus prime matter through a removal [ablationem] of all act and perfection is also said (to be) simple. However *the highest* simplicity excludes whatever kind of composition, both *active* or composition *out of* others, as much as *passive* or composition *with* others. This most high simplicity certainly conveys not only a privation of composition, but also « a most noble manner of unity, which God communicates to no creature » (cf. following question, at n. 1).

II. Quoad argum. 3. in fund. notandum, illud axioma (quo utitur etiam S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I. c. 18 et Ricard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1), quod simpliciora sint nobiliora, valere tantum, si subintelligatur: *ceteris paribus*. In rebus enim corruptibilibus totum compositum, quod complecitur perfectionem sui et partium, potest esse perfectius quam pars simplex, sicut homo nobilior est quam materia, vel etiam quam sola anima. Cfr. Richard., loc. cit. q. 2..

II. In regard to the third argument in the fundament, it must be noted, that that axiom (which St. Thomas also uses, Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. I, c. 18, and Richard of Middletown, here in a. 3. q. 1), that the more simple are the more noble, is valid only, if there be understood: *ceteris paribus*. For in corruptible things the whole composite, which embraces the perfection of itself and of its parts, can be more perfect than the simple part, just as man is more noble than (his) matter, and/or even than the soul alone. Cf. Richard (of Middletown), loc. cit., q. 2.

III. Conclusio ipsa, qua eliditur error Gilberti Porretani et abbatis Ioachim, definita est primo in Concilio Rhemensi, tum in Lateran, IV c. Firmiter, de S. Trinit.: « Deus est . . . una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino ». Cfr. infra dub. 6. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 5. m. 1. et 2, et q. 14. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1; Report., hic q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. et q. 4. a. 1; S. I. q. 3. a. 3. 4. 5. 8. ; S. c. Gent. I. c. 16. 18. — B. Albert., hic a. 22. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. S. a. 28. et 29. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Diel, hic q. 7. dub. 2.

III. The conclusion itself, by which the error of Gilbert of Porretain and Abbot Ioachim (de Fiore) is cast out, had been first defined in the Council of Rheims, then at the Fourth Council of the Lateran, in the chapter Firmiter, on the Holy Trinity: « God is . . . one essence, substance or entirely simple nature ». Cf. below dubium 6. — Alexander of Hales., Summa., p. I, q. 5. m. 1. and 2, and q. 14, m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here at q. 1; Reportatio., here at q. 4. — St. Thomas, here at q. 1, a. 1 and at q. 4, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 3, aa. 3, 4, 5 and 8. ; Summa Contra Gentiles, I, c. 16 and 18. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here at a. 22. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 5, a. 1. — Richard of Middletown, here at a. 3. q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in 1. princ, q. 4. — Henry of Gent, concerning this and the following, Summa., aa. 28 and 29. — Durandus, here at q. 1.. — (Bl.) Dionysus the Carthusian, here at q. 5. — (Gabriel)

Biel, here at q. 7, dubium 2.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS II.
ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 167-170.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART II
ARTICLE SOLE

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 167-170.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Quaestio II.

Utrum summa simplicitas soli Deo conveniat.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum simplicitas sit Dei proprietas. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Nulla creatura est actus purus, quia in

Question 2

Whether a most high simplicity befits God alone.

SECOND IT IS ASKED, whether simplicity is a property of God. And that (it is) so, seems in this manner:

1. No creature is pure act, because in every

omni creatura, ut dicit Boethius,[1] differt *quo est* et *quod est*; ergo in omni creatura est actus cum possibili; sed omnis talis habet in se multiformitatem et caret simplicitate: ergo etc.

creature, as Boethius says,[1] *that whereby it is* and *what it is* differ; therefore in every creature there is an act with the possible; but every such has in itself multiformity and lacks simplicity: ergo etc..

2. Item, omnis creatura habet esse finitum et limitatum; ergo habet esse arctatum;[2] sed ubicumque est esse limitatum, est ibi aliquid quod contrahit, et aliquid quod contrahitur, et in omni tali est compositio et differentia: ergo omnis creatura est composita: ergo nulla simplex.

2. Likewise, every creature has a finite and limited “being” [esse]; therefore it has a constrained “being” [esse arctatum][2]; but wherever limited “being” is, there is something which contracts, and something which is contracted, and in every such there is composition and difference: therefore every creature is a composite: therefore none (is) simple.

3. Item, omnis creatura habet esse datum aliunde, ergo habet esse aliunde acceptum, ergo nulla creatura est suum esse, ergo in omni creatura est dependentia sive differentia; sed nullum tale simpliciter simplex: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, every creature has a "to be" [esse] given from elsewhere [aliunde], therefore it has a "to be" accepted from elsewhere, therefore no creature is its own "to be", therefore in every creature there is dependence or difference; but no such (is) simply simple: ergo etc..

4. Item, omne, quod est post primam unitatem, deficit ab illa, ergo statim cadit in dualitatem, sicut dicit Dionysius,[3] quod post monadem dyas est: sed omnis creatura est a prima unitate: ergo omnis creatura est ab illa deficiens: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, everything, which is after the First Unity, defects from That, therefore it immediately falls into duality, just as Dionysius (the Areopagite) says,[3] that after the Monad is the dyad: but every creature is from [a] the First Unity: therefore every creature is defecting from That: ergo etc..

C**CONTRA**: 1. « Ab uno non procedit nisi unum »[4] et a vero non procedit nisi verum; sed unitas et simplicitas eandem rationem habent in Deo: ergo sicut ab uno unum, ita a simplici simplex.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. « From one there does not proceed but one »[4] and from the true there does not proceed but the true; but unity and simplicity have the same reckoning in God: therefore just as from one one, so from the simple the simple.

2. Item, videtur specialiter, quod simplicitas sit in creaturis, quia simplex est quod non habet partem; sed punctus non habet partem, quia ita definitur: punctus est, cuius pars non est:[5] ergo etc.

2. Likewise, it especially seems, that simplicity is in creatures, because the simple is that which does not have a part; but a point does not have a part, because it is defined thus: “a point is, that of which there is not a part”:[5] ergo etc..

3. Item, omne illud, ante quod non est aliud, est simplex; quia si compositum est, necessario habet ante se aliud; sed ens est primum, sicut dicit auctor de Causis:[6] « Prima rerum creatarum est esse »: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, every “that”, before which there is not an other, is simple; because if it was composed, it necessarily has an other before itself; but there is a First Being [ens primum], as the author (of the book) <u>On Causes</u> says:[6] « The first of created things is

"being" [esse]: ergo etc..

4. Item, omne illud est simplex, in quo stat resolutio; sed resolutio stat in principiis, quae sunt materia et forma, quia materia ulterius non resolvitur, cum sit status in causis, alioquin esset ire in infinitum:[7] ergo cum resolutio stet in creato, aliquid creatum est simplex. *Si tu dicas*, quod principia non habent omnimodam simplicitatem, quia quamvis non componantur ex aliis, tamen componuntur aliis; *contra*: hoc non videtur facere contra simplicitatem, quod componatur alii. Nam quod aliquid non sit componibile alii, non facit aliquam simplicitatem, cum ista proprietas[8] sit in individuis completis, quae maxime sunt composita: ergo hoc quod dico *componibile aliis*, non tolit ab eis simpliciatem, et sic etc.

4. Likewise, every "that" is simple, in which resolution stands still [stat]; but resolution stands still in the principles, which are matter and form, because matter is not further resolved, since there is a stability [status] in (its) causes, otherwise there would be an infinite regress [ire in infinitum]:[7] therefore since resolution stands still in the created, something created is simple. *If you say*, that principles do not have an every-mannered simplicity, because although they are not composed out of others [ex aliis], nevertheless [tamen] they are composed by others [aliis]; *on the contrary*: this does not seem to make (a case) against simplicity, that they are composed of an other [alii]. For that something is not composable of an other [alii], does not cause any simplicity, since that property[8] (of it) is in complete individuals, which are in the greatest manner composite: therefore that I say this, *composable by others* [aliis], does not take away simplicity from them, and thus etc..

---

[1] In libro de Hebdomad. et de Trin. c. 2. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 3.
[2] Cod. X *contractum*.
[3] De Div. Nom. c. 1. et 13. — Mox lectio Vat. *ergo* pro *sed* corrigitur ex mss. et ed. 1.
[4] Ita Avicenna, IX. Metaph. c. 2. seqq. Cfr. etiam Averroes, Comment. in XII. Metaph. text. 44. Allegatur etiam II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10), ubi Aristot. ait: Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere.
[5] Euclid., I. Geometriae, ubi iuxta translationem Boethii habetur: Punctus est, cuius pars nulla est.
[6] Propos. 4. — Mendum Vat., quae post *causis* habet *sed primum*, castigatur ope mss. et ed. 1.
[7] Cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. per totum (I. brevior.), ubi processus in infinitum in genere causarum reprobatur. De materia et forma, quatenus sunt principia vide Aristot., I. Phys. text. 42. 82. (c. 5. 9.); et Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Princip. prop. 1. — Cod. V *abire* loco *ire*.
[8] Nempe: quod aliquid non sit componibile. — Paulo ante cod. cc *componantur* loco *componatur*, ubi supple: aliquid.

[1] In his book On Weeks and On the Trinity, ch. 2. See above d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, fundament 3.
[2] Codex X reads *contracted* [contractum].
[3] On the Divine Names, chs. 1 and 13. — Then the reading of the Vatican text, *therefore* [ergo] in place of *but* [sed], is corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1.
[4] Thus Avicenna, Metaphysics, Bk. IX, ch. 2 ff.. Cf. also Averroes, Commentary on Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 44. There is an allusion also to On Generation and corruption, Bk. II, text 56 (ch. 10), where Aristotle says: For the same also holding itself similarly is bound to cause always the same.
[5] Euclid, Geometry, Bk. I, where according to the translation of Boethius there is had: A point is, that of which there is no part.
[6] Proposition 4. — The error of the Vatican text, which after *On Causes* [de Causis] has *but the first* [sed primum], is corrected with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1.
[7] Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II throughout (Bk. I, shorter version), where a processing unto the infinite in the genus of causes is reproved. Concerning matter and form, to the extent that they are principles, see Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, texts 42, 82 (chs. 5, 9); and Gilbert of Porretain, On the Six Principles., proposition 1. — Codex V reads *go off* [abire] in place of *to go* [ire].
[8] Namely: that something be not composable. — A little before this codex cc has *they are composed* [componantur] in place of *is composed*

[componatur], where the subject is understood to be: something [aliquid].

CONCLUSIO.

Deus solum esse summe simplicem, duplici modo probatur.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod simplicitas essentiae privat compositionem et privat essentialem differentiam sive multiplicitatem. Unde simplex est, quod non habet compositionem partium nec multiplicatem actionum[1] sive formarum. In solo autem Deo est privatio compositionis et differentiae sive multiplicitatis: ideo simplicitas in solo Deo est essentialiter.

Unde notandum, quod multiplex est *compositio*. Una compositio est ex partibus *essentialibus*; et haec est in omnibus per se entibus;[2] alia est ex partibus *integrantibus*; et haec est in omnibus corporibus; tertia est ex partibus *dissimilis* sive repugnantibus; et haec est in omnibus animalis et viventibus. Unde in omni substantia per se ente, quae proprie[3] dicitur creatura, est compositio, quia omnis creatura aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis, aut composita ex utroque.

Similiter est considerare triplicem *differentiam* in creaturis. Prima est *substantiae*, *virtutis* et *operationis*,[4] sive substantiae et accidentis; secunda est differentia *suppositi* et *essentiae*; tertia est differentia *entis* et *esse*.[5] Prima differentia est rei, prout est agens; secunda, prout est ens in genere; tertia, prout est ens in se. Prima differentia est in omni *subiecto*, quoniam omne[6] subiectum habet esse mixtum: ideo non agit ex se toto, et ideo differt in eo *quo* agit et *quod* agit, et *actio* sive subiectum et proprietas.[7] Secunda differentia est in omni *individuo*, quia omne individuum habet esse limitatum; et ideo in aliquo convenit, in aliquod differt cum alio,

CONCLUSION

That God alone is most highly simple, is proven in a twofold manner.

I RESPONDEO: It must be said, that simplicity of essence deprives [privat] (a thing) of composition and deprives (it) of essential difference or multiplicity. Whence the simple is, 'that which does not have composition of parts nor multiplicity of actions[1] or of forms'. But in God alone is there privation of composition and of difference or multiplicity: for that reason simplicity is essentially in God alone.

Whence it must be noted, that *composition* is manifold. One composition is out of *essential* parts; and this is in all per se (created) beings;[2] another is out of *integrating* parts; and this is in all bodies; the third is out of *dissimilar* or repugnant parts; and this is in all animals and living (things). Whence in every substance that is through itself [substantia per se ente], which is properly[3] said (to be) a creature, there is composition, because every creature either is corporal, or spiritual, or composed out of both.

Similarly is it to consider the threefold *difference* in creatures. The first is of *substance*, *virtue*, and *operation*,[4] or of substance and accident; the second is the difference of *supposit* and *essence*; the third is the difference of *a being* and *to be* [entis et esse].[5] The first difference is of a thing, insofar as it is an agent; the second, insofar as it is a being in general; the third, insofar as it is a being in itself. The first difference is in every *subject*, since every[6] subject has a mixed "being" [esse mixtum]: for that reason it does not act out of its whole self, and for that reason there is a difference in that *whereby* it acts and *what* acts, and the *action* or subject and the propterty[7] (differ).

et ideo in omni individuo differt *essentia* et *suppositum*; multiplicatur enim essentia in suppositis. Tertia differentia est in omni *creato* et *concreato*:[8] quia enim omne, quod est praeter Deum, accipit esse aliunde, sive principium sit, sive principiatum: ideo nihil est suum esse, sicut lux non est suum lucere.

The second difference is in every *individual*, because every individual has a limited *"being"* [esse limitatum]; and for that reason in something it convenes, in something it differs with an other, and for that reason in every individual *essence* and *supposit* differ; for essence is multiplied in supposits. The third difference is in every *created* and *concreated*:[8] because for every (thing), which is besides God, it accepts a "to be" [esse] from elsewhere, whether it be a ‘principle’ or ‘that which depends upon a principle’ [principium sive principiatum]: for that reason nothing is its own "to be", just as light is not its own lighting.

Si ergo dicatur simplictas per privationem *compositionis*, sic proprium est solius Dei in ratione *substantiae*, quia nulla alia substantia est, quae non habet[9] compositionem ex possibili et actuali saltem.

Therefore if simplicity is meant through a privation of *composition*, so it is proper to God alone in the reckoning of a *substance*, because there is no other substance, which does not at least have[9] a composition out of possible and actual.

Si autem simplicitas dicat privationem *essentialis differentiae et dependentiae*, ita quod in essentia nulla sit diversitas nec dependentia,[10] est proprium Dei in ratione *entis*, quia nullum aliud ens est, in quo non cadat aliqua diversitas vel dependentia.

But if simplicity means a privation of *essential difference and dependence*, so that in essence there is no diversity nor dependence,[10] it is proper to God in the reckoning of *a being* [in ratione entis], because there is no other being [ens], in which there does not fall a diversity and/or dependence.

Concendendum ergo est, quod simplicitas est Dei proprium, ut visum est. Creaturae autem compositae sunt nec vere simplices, quia habent esse *mixtum* ex actu et potentia, quia habent esse *limitatum*, et ita in genere et specie per additionem contractum, quia habent esse *aliunde datum*, quia habent esse *post Deum unum*, a quo deficiunt; et ita cadunt in compositionem.[11]

Therefore it must be conceded, that simplicity is proper to God, as has been seen. Moreover composite creatures are neither truly simple, because they have a “being” [esse] mixed out of act and potency, because the have a *limited* “being” [esse limitatum], and thus contracted in genus and species through addition, because they have a "to be" [esse] *given from elsewhere*, because they have a "to be" *after the One God*, from whom they defect; and thus they fall into composition.

Aliter potest dici et brevius,[12] quod simplex dicitur per privationem compositionis. Sed notandum, quod compositio dicitur dupliciter: *uno* modo alicuius *ex aliquibus*; *alio* modo, qua[13] aliquid dicitur componi *alii*. Si ergo simplicitas privet compositionem *ex aliis*, sic convenit etiam creatis, utpote primis principiis,[14] quae non componuntur

Otherwise it can also be said briefly,[12], that simple is meant through a privation of composition. But it must be noted, that composition is meant in a twofold manner: in *one* manner of something *out of somethings*; in *an other* manner, by which (composition)[13] something is said to be composed *of an other*. Therefore if

ex aliis. Si autem privet compositionem *cum aliis* et *ex aliis*, sic solius Dei est. Omnis enim creatura aut est ens *per se* et *in se*;[15] et ita composita *ex aliis*; aut est ens *cum alio* et *in alio*; et ita *alii* composita. Et iterum omne creatum aut est *principium*; et ita componibile alii; aut *principiatum*; et sic compositum ex aliis; et sic accipitur simplicitas, prout est rei proprietas, per privationem, videlicet utriusque compositionis.

simplicity deprives a thing of composition *out of others*, thus it befits even created (things), as the first principles,[14] which are not composed out of others. But if it deprives a thing of composition *with others* and *out of others*, it thus belongs to God alone. For every creature either is a being *through itself* and *in itself* [ens per se et in se];[15] and thus (is) composed *out of others*; or it is a being *with an other* and *in an other* [ens cum alio et in alio]; and thus (is) composed *of an other*. And again every created either is a *principle*; and thus (is) composable of an other; or (is) *'that which depends upon a principle'*; and thus (is) composed out of others; and in this manner is simplicity accepted, insofar as it is a property of a thing, through privation, namely of each (kind of) composition.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ab uno non est nisi unum etc.; dicendum, quod simplex non est conditio generalis entis sicut unum. Nam / simplicitas dicit . . .

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that from one there is not but one etc.; it must be said, that the 'simple' is not a general condition of a being as the 'one' is. For / simplicity means . . .

---

[1] Ed. 1 *accidentium* loco *actionum*, cum qua lectione concordant verba Magistri, hic c. 3. in initio, et explicatio ipsorum infra dub. 2. Pro lectione mss. allegari potest Alan. ab Insul. Regul. theolog., reg. 1, ubi praeter pluralitatem partium et proprietatum affert pluralitatem *effectum*, quae attenditur in proprietatibus; sic albedo facit album, facit coloratum, facit qualem. Deus autem non est diversus effectibus variis, quia non est causa *formalis*. Utraque tamen lectio in idem recidit, ut patet ex iis, quae paulo infra habentur.
[2] Sive substantiis, supple creatis. — Mox cod. W *secunda* loco *alia*.
[3] Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus aliis mss. et ed 1, male omittit *proprie*.
[4] Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. Cf. supra p. 79. Nota 5.
[5] Vide Boeth., de Trin. c. 2. seqq. et de Hebdomad.
[6] Vat. falso et contra mss. necnon ed. 1 *esse* pro *omne*. — Boeth., de Trin. c. 2. ostendit, quod nullum simplex esse possit subiectum accidentium; cuius propositionis explicationem vide apud Alan. ab insul. Regul. theolog., reg. 12.
[7] Corrupta lectio Vat. *sive subiecti proprietas* resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1.
[8] Substantiae sive supposita dicuntur *creari*; accidentia et annexa, inter quae est ipsa creatio passive sumta, dicuntur *concreari*. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *enim*.
[9] Aliqui codd. ut H T cum edd. 1, 4, 5 *habeat*.
[10] Nonnulli codd. ut H I aa bb addunt *sic*.

---

[1] Edition 1 has *of accidents* [accidentium] in place of *of actions* [actionum], with which reading the words of Master (Peter) are in agreement, here in ch. 3 at the beginning, and their explanation given below in dubium 2. For the reading of the manuscripts there can be alleged Alan of the Isle's, Rules for Theology, rule 1, where besides the plurality of parts and properties he brings forward a plurality of *effects* [effectuum], which is tended toward in the properties; thus whiteness causes white, causes (a thing to be) colored, causes such. But God is not diverse in various effects, because He is not a *formal* cause. Each reading, however, refers to the same thing, as is clear from those things, which are had a little before this.
[2] Or substances, supply "created" [creatis]. — Then codex W has *second* [secunda] in place of *the other* [alia].
[3] The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing with the other manuscripts and edition 1, badly omits *properly* [proprie].
[4] Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Celestial Hierarchies, ch. 11. Cf. above p. 79, footnote 5.
[5] See Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 ff. and On Weeks.
[6] The Vatican text falsely and contrary to the manuscripts and to edition 1 has *a subjected "being"* [esse subiectum] in place of *every subject* [omne subiectum]. — Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 shows, that no simple "being" can be a subject of accidents; see the explanation of this proposition in Alan of the Isle, Rules for Theology, rule 12.

[11] Vide Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.
[12] Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *brevius* loco *verius* et paulo infra *Sed* pro *Et*.
[13] Ita plurimi codd. ut A C F H K R S T U cc ee cum edd. 1, 2, 3; Vat. *quo*. Refertur *qua* ad *compositio*.
[14] Vat. cum coc. cc praeter fidem ceterorum et ed. 1 omittit minus bene *principiis*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut E F H I K Q X Z *creaturis* pro *creatis*.
[15] Id est substantia completa, cui opponitur accidens. — Paulo infra fide plurimum mss. ut H T aa bb ee et ed. 1 post *iterum* posuimus *omne* loco *esse*; codd. aa bb habent *omne esse*.

[7] The corrupted reading of the Vatican text, *or property of a subject* [sive subiecti proprietas] is repaired with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1.
[8] Substances or supposits are said *to be created* [creari]; accidents and their annexed (properties), among which is creation itself, passively considered, are said *to be concreated* [concreari]. Cf. Sent., Bk II, d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2. — Then trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted *For* [enim]. [Trans. Note: further down: that which begins a series in any order of being is said to be a *principle* in that order; in Latin *principle* is principium a word that means also ‘a beginning’: its correlative principiatum means ‘that which is begun’ and hence in a philosophical context a ‘that which depends upon a principle’.]
[9] Some codices as H T together with editions 1, 4 and 5, have the subjunctive form of *have* [habeat].
[10] Not a few codices as H I aa and bb add *in this manner* [sic].
[11] See Boethius, On Unity and the One.
[12] From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *more breifly* [brevius] in place of *more truly* [verius] and a little below this *But* [Sed] in place of *And* [Et].
[13] Thus very many codices as A C F H K R S T U cc ee together with editions 1, 2, and 3; the Vatican text has *whereby* [quo]; *by which* [qua] refers to *composition* [compositio].
[14] The Vatican text together with codex cc, not trusting in all the others and edition 1, omits less well *principles* [principiis]. A little before this very many codices as E F H I K Q X and Z have *creatures* [creaturis] in place of *created (things)* [creatis].
[15] That is a complete substance, to which an accident is opposed. — A little below this, trusting in very many manuscripts as H T aa bb and ee and edition 1, we have placed after *again* [iterum] *every* [omne] in place of *being* [esse]; codices aa and bb have *every created being* [omne esse creatum].

---

p. 169

Nam / simplicitas dicit modum unitatis nobilissimum, quem Deus nulli communicat creaturae; quia creatura non potest recipere, cum esse eius sit limitatum, sit[1] mixtum, sit etiam esse dependens et aliunde datum.

For / simplicity means a most noble manner of unity, which God communicates to no creature; because a creature cannot receive (it), since its “being” [esse] has been limited, has been[1] mixted, (and) is also a "to be" [esse] dependent and given from elsewhere.

2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate puncti et entis et principii, dicendum, quod ibi est simplicitas per privationem compositionis ex aliis, non autem prout simplicitas dicit indifferentiam

2. 3. 4. To that which is objected concerning the simplicity of a point and of a being [entis] and of a principle, it must be said, that there is a simplicity through a privation of composition out of others there, but not

omnimodam. In omnibus enim, ut dictum est, cadit aliqua differentia et dependentia: quamvis enim non sint composita, tamen eorum esse dependet a composito, sive compositione.

insofar as simplicity means an every-mannered indifference [indifferentiam omnimodam]. For in all (things), as has been said, there falls some difference and dependence: for although they have not been composed, nevertheless [tamen] their "being" does depend from a composite, or from a composition.

Unde bene concedendum est illud quod ultimo dicebatur, quod illud derogat simplicitati rei, quod sit alteri componibilis, in quantum simplicitas privat *multiplicitatem* et *differentiam* in re simplici, quamvis non deroget, in quantum privat[2] *compositionem ex aliis*. Omnis enim dependentia facit ipsum quod dependet a summa simplicitate et indifferentia recedere. Solus autem Deus est independens. Omnia autem alia sunt dependentia, sive comparatione ad principia, ex quibus sunt, sive unum principium componens complicetur ad aliud, sive esse dependens[3] comparatione ad Deum sive ab ipso Deo. Nihil autem, quod dependet, est sua dependentia: ideo nihil tale est summe simplex, quia omne simplicissimum est absolutissimum.[4]

Whence there must be well conceded that which was said last, that that derogates from the simplicity of a thing, which is composable of the other (of the two), inasmuch as simplicity deprives a thing of *multiplicity* and *difference* in a simple thing, although it does derogate, inasmuch as it deprives a thing of[2] *composition out of others*. For every dependence causes that which depends to recede from most high simplicity and indifference. But God alone is independent. Moreover all others are by a dependence, whether by comparison to the principles, out of which they are, or whether (their) one composing principle (be) complex regarding another [complicetur ad aliud], or whether (theirs be) a "being" dependent [esse dependens][3] by a comparison to God or from God Himself. But nothing, which depends, is its own dependence: for that reason nothing such is most highly simple, because every most simple is most absolute.[4]

SCHOLION.

I. In responsione dicitur, quod compositio ex partibus essentialibus, scil. materia et forma, est « in omnibus per se entibus ». His verbis S. Bonav. tangit illam opinionem, quod etiam in Angelis sit aliquo modo *spiritualis* materia et forma. Hic modus loquendi et ante et post S. Thomam in scholis fuit receptus et approbatus; nunc vero est obsoletus, immo multis immerito est lapis offensionis [trans. nota: quoniam misconceperunt nominem scholasticam, scil. materia, sumpta in sensu empiricali et hinc ut corporeale particulatum, quam sumpta magis generaliter ut potentia entitatis absoluta, quo sensu communiter scholastici ipsam conceperunt]. Quo sensu haec locutio ab ipso S. Bonav., Alex. Hal. et

SCHOLIUM

I. In the response it is said, that composition out of essential parts, namely matter and form, is « in all per se beings [per se entibus] ». With these words St. Bonaventure touches upon that opinion, which (says that) even in the Angels there is in some manner a *spiritual* matter and form. This manner of speaking both before and after St. Thomas was received and approved of in the schools; now, however, it is obsolete, nay rather to many it is undeservedly an point of contention [Trans. note: because they misconstrue the scholastic term "matter" [materia] with the empirical term, and hence misconceive it as a "particulate corporeal" rather than the more general "absolute potency for entity",

aliis multis intellecta sit, alibi dicetur; cfr. interim II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, et d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 61. m. 1; ibid. q. 20. m. 2. § 1.

which the Scholastics commonly held it to be]. In what sense this saying by St. Bonaventure himself, Alexander of Hales and many others was understood, will be said in another place; cf. in the meantime to Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 61, m. 1; ibid., q. 20, m. 2. § 1.

II. Duae exhibentur quaestionis solutiones. In *primo* enumerantur quinque genera compositionis; aliud sextum genus, quod est ex genere et differentia, infra (q. 4. huius dist.) specialiter explicatur. — *Secundum* modum dicendi S. Doctor declarat veriorem, cui consentit S. Thom., S. I. q. 3. a. 7. et 8.

II. Two solutions to the question are exhibited. In the *first* there are enumerated five genera of composition; the other sixth genus, which is out of genus and difference, is below (q. 4 of this distinction) especially explained. — The *second* manner of speaking the Seraphic Doctor declares (to be) truer, to which St. Thomas consents, Summa., I, q. 3, aa. 7 and 8.

III. Celebris est distinctio inter *quod* est et *quo* est, sive inter essentiam et existentiam. Sumta est haec distinctio ex Boethii libro de Hebdomad., vel potius ex commentario, quem Gilbertus Porretanus in hoc opusculum scripsit. Deus quidem est et sua essentia et suum esse, ut dicit sententia communis, sed in creatura *esse* {existentia} non est id *quod* existit, sed *quo* essentia existit. Haec distinctio ab omnibus admittitur, sed de natura eiusdem fuit et est controversia. Nominales volunt, hanc distinctionem esse *solius rationis*; pluralitas Thomistarum, eam esse *realem*; Scot. ver (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2 et d. 3. q. 3.) tenet hic suam distinctionem *formalem*. Seraphicus Doctor in his duabus quaestionibus naturam huius distinctionis explicite non determinat, tamen verba eius valde conveniunt cum verbis S. Thomae. Trigosus (S. q. 3. a. 2. dub. 4) putat, S. Bonaventuram docere realem distinctionem inter esse et essentiam creaturae, sed non tanquam inter duas res, sed sicut inter rem et actum sive modum eiusdem; insuper ipsum S. Thomam et etiam Scotum in eandem fere sententiam convenire asserit. Cfr. circa hanc controversiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 12. m. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., Quodl. 1. q. 8. — Aegid. R. , hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Chart., hic q. 7, ubi retractat id quod prius pro distinctione reali in sensu multorum Thomistarum scripserat; Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 2.

III. Celebrated is the distinction between *what* one is and *whereby* one is, or between essence and existence. This distinction is taken from Boethius' book On Weeks, and/or rather out of the commentary, which Gilbert of Porretain wrote on this short work. God indeed is both His own Essence and His own "to be" [esse], as the common sentence says, but in a creature the "to be" {existence} is not that *which* exists, but that *whereby* the essence exists. This distinction is admitted by all, but concerning the nature of the same there was and is a controversy. The Nominalists want, that this distinction belong to *a reckoning alone*; very many of the Thomists, that it be *real*; (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, however, in Sent., Bk II, d. 1, q. 2 and d. 3, q. 3) holds his own *formal* distinction on this point. The Seraphic Doctor in these two questions does not explicitly determine the nature of this distinction, however his words agree very much with the words of St. Thomas. Trisogus (Summa., q. 3, a. 2, dubium 4) thinks, that St. Bonaventure taught that there is a real distinction between the "to be" [esse] and the essence of a creature, but not as if between two things, but just as (there is) between a thing and act or the manner of the same; moreover he asserts that St. Thomas himself and even Scotus agreed in nearly the same sentence. Cf. on this controversy, Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 12, m. 2 and 3. — Richard

of Middletown, Quodlibetals, 1, q. 8. — Giles the Roman, here in 1 princ. q. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 7, where he retracts that which he had first written on behalf of a real distinction in the sense of many of the Thomists; Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 28, q. 4. — Durandus, here in q. 2.

IV. Tangitur in hac et sequenti quaestione alia celebris controversia de distinctione, quae est in Deo *inter essentiam et attributa et inter ipsa attributa*, utrum scil. haec sit solummodo *rationis rationalis*, ut dicunt Nominales, an sit *formalis* in sensu Scoti (hic q. 4.), an *virtualis* sive fundamentalis, ut vult S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 2. q. unic. a. 2. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 4.). Sententiae Angelici S. Bonav. quoad distinctionem inter *essentiam* divinam et *attributa absoluta* omnino consentit. Distinctionem enim *virtualem* in sensu S. Thom. ipse *egregie* explicat infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.; cfr. etiam d. 22. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. et ad 3; d. 27. p. I. a. 1. q. 3; d. 34. q. 2. in corp.; d. 35. q. 2. in corp.; d. 7. q. 4, et in hac nostra dist. p. I. q. 1; p. II. q. 1 et 2. — Etiam in illa quaestione connexa, utrum distinctio *virtualis* iam sufficiat ad verificanda contradictoria de eadem re, S. Bonav. videtur stare potius a parte scholae S. Thomae, quae hoc affirmat, quam Scoti, quae hoc negat. Dicit enim S. Bonav. (infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 1 ad 5.), quod «quantulacumque differentia rationis sufficit ad affirmationem et negationem », quod notandum pro doctrina de SS. Trinitate. Cfr. etiam d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; d. 19. p. II. a. 1 q. 2. ad 4; d. 28 a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; d. 35. a. 1. q. 3; d. 43. q. 1. ad 3.

IV. In this and the following question there is touched upon another celebrated controversy concerning the distinction, which is in God *between His essence and attributes, and among the attributes themselves*, whether, namely, this be in the manner alone of a *rational reckoning*, as the Nominalists say, or whether it be *formal* in the sense of (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 4, or whether (it be) *virtual* or fundamental, as St. Thomas wants it in Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. sole, aa. 2 and 3; Summa., I, q. 13, a. 4. To the sentence of the Angelic (Doctor) St. Bonaventure entirely consents in regard to the distinction between the Divine *Essence* and (His) *absolute attributes*. For the *virtual* distinction, in the sense of St. Thomas, he *egregiously* explains below in d. 45, a. 2, q. 1 in the body; cf. also d. 22, a. 1, q. 2 in the body and at n. 3; d. 27, p. I, a. 1, q. 3; d. 34, q. 2 in the body; d. 35, q. 2 in the body; d. 7, q. 4, and in this current distinction, p. I, q. 1; p. II, qq. 1 and 2. — Also in that connected question, whether the *virtual* distinction already suffices to verify the contradictory (statements) on the matter, St. Bonaventure seems to stand rather on the side of the school of St. Thomas, which affirms this, than on that of (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, which denies this. For St. Bonaventure says, below in d. 34, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 5, that « howsoever small a difference of reckoning suffices for affirmation and negation », which must be noted on behalf of the doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity. Cf. also d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 1; d. 19, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, at n. 4; d. 28, a. 1, q. 1 in the body, d. 35, a. 1, q. 3; d. 43, q. 1, at n. 3.

Alia vero quaestio est de distintione inter *relationes* et *essentiam* divinam, quam S. Doctor expressis verbis affirmat esse maiorem quam illam, quae est inter

On the other hand there is the other question concerning the distinction between the *relations* and the Divine *Essence*, which the Seraphic Doctor with express words

attributa *absoluta* et *essentiam*,

does affirm to be greater than the former, which is between (His) *absolute* attributes and (His) *Essence*,

---

[1] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et quinque primarum edd. *et* pro *sit*. Mox codd. A C G L O R S X aa bb havent *sicut etiam* pro *sit etiam*.
[2] Faventibus multis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *privat* loco *privet*.
[3] Ita codd. H K cum Vat., in qua lectione verba *esse depenens* referas ad subiectum *omnia alia sunt*; ceteri codd. cum ed. 1 ponunt *omne dependens*, sed minus congrue, etiamsi suplleas verbum *est*, ob mutationem subiecti; utraque lectio non caret difficultate grammaticali.
[4] Libr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Seraphicus ait: Omne dependens hoc ipso cadit in aliquam compositionem, quia differt *quo est* et *quod est*. — Explicationem huius accipe a B. Albert., S. p. I. tract. 4. q. 20. m. 2: In principiis etiam substantiae non potest esse simplicitas, quia licet ex aliis principiis substantiae non componantur, tamen aliud habent hoc *quod sunt*, et aliud *quo* principia substantiae sunt; hoc enim *quod sunt*, res quaedam et substantiae sunt, quia ex non substantiis non fit substantia, ut dicit Philosophus. Eo autem *quo* principia substantiae sunt, utrumque principiorum dependentiam habet ad alterum. Materia . . . ad formam ut ad actum, et forma ad materiam ut ad id in quo habet esse distinctum . . . Similiter dicendum est de componentibus. — Libr. I. Sent. d. 8. a. 24. ad hanc obiectionem: relatio creaturae ad Creatorem est quid extrinsecum, adeoque non facit creaturae compositionem, respondet: Dicendum, quod sola relatio ad causam efficientem non facit eis compositionem, sed hoc quod relinquitur in eis ex tali exitu in esse . . . ex hoc ipso, quod res exit in esse post nihil, remanet potentia tendendi in nihil, nisi contineatur ab alio.

[1] The Vatican text without the authority of the manuscripts and the five first editions has *and* [et] in place of *has been* [sit]. Then codices A C G L O R S X aa and bb have *so also* [sicut etiam] in place of *(and) also is* [sit etiam].
[2] Favored by many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *it deprives a thing* [privat] in place of *it may deprive a thing* [privet].
[3] Thus codices H K together with the Vatican text, in which reading the words *a "being" dependent* [esse dependens] refer to the subject *all others are* [omnia alia sunt]; all the other codices together with edition 1 have *every dependent* [omne dependens], but less congruously, even if you supply the word *is* [est], on account of the change of the subject; each reading does not lack a grammatical difficulty [tran. note: which difficulty is easily solved by supplying *their* [eorum] as is had in the translation, which assumption seems to be the simplest contextual interpretation].
[4] Sent., Book II, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1 in the body, the Seraphic Doctor says: Every dependent by this very fact falls into some composition, because (its) *whereby it is* and *what it is* differ. — Take Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great)'s explanation of this, Summa., p. I, tract 4, q. 20, m. 2: In the principles of a substance there also cannot be simplicity, because though substances are not composed out of other principles, they do have, however, this one *what they are*, and an other *whereby* the principles of the substance are; for this *what they are*, are certain things and substances, because out of non-substances there is not made a substance, as the Philosopher says. Moreover by that *whereby* the principles of a substance are, each of the principles has a dependence as regards the other. Matter . . . to form as to act, and form to matter as to that in which it has a distinct "to be" . . . Similarly it must be said concerning components. — Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, a. 24, regarding this objection: the relation of a creature to the Creator is something extrinsic, and to this extent it does not cause a composition of a creature, he responds: It must be said, that solely the relation to the efficient cause does not cause a composition of them, but that which is left in them out of such a going forth into “being” [in esse] . . . out of this itself, that a thing goes forth into “being” after nothing, there remains a potency of tending into nothing, unless it be contained by an other.

---

p. 170

et inter attributa haec ad invicem, eamque tanquam tertium divisionis membrum et

and between these attributes as regards one another, and he exhibits this as the

medium exhibet, dum agit de triplici divisione eorum, quae tantum ratione differunt; vide infra d. 26. q. 1. ad 2. et 3, et d. 22. q. 4. Haec secunda species a Seraphico distincta, ut vult Brulifer, dedit occasionem Scoto suam excogitandi distinctionem *formalem*. De sententia S. Bonaventurae cfr. d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion ad d. 26. q. 1.

third and middle member of the distinction, while he deals with the threefold division of those, which differ only by reckoning; see below d. 26, q. 1, at n. 2 and 3, and d. 22, q. 4. This second species distinguished by the Seraphic (Doctor), as Brulifer wants it, gave Scotus occasion to think out his own *formal* distinction. On the sentence of St. Bonaventure, cf. d. 13, q. 3, and the Scholium on d. 26, q. 1.

Circa distinctionem virtualem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 52. m. 1, et q. 56. m. 7. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. d. 3. a. 4, et hic a. 3. 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 2. 1. princ. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 51; et Quodl. 5. q. 1. — Durand., d. 2, q. 2. et 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2.

About the virtual distinction, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 52, m. 1, and q. 56, m. 7, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., p. I, d. 3, a. 4, and here in aa. 3, 4, 5. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 1, aa. 2, 3. — Richard of Middletown, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, a. 1. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, 1st. princ. q. 2, 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 51; et Quodlibetales. 5, q. 1. — Durandus, d. 2, qq. 2 and 3. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 2.

V. In conclusione principali conveniunt omnes: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 5. m. 3; p. II. q. 12. per totam. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 5. a. 1. et 2.; S. I. q. 3. a. 7. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 24. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. — Biel, hic q. 7. dub. 3.

V. In the principle conclusion all agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 5, m. 3; p. II, q. 12 throughout. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2. — St. Thomas, here in q. 5, aa. 1 and 2.; Summa., I, q. 3, aa. 7, 8. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 24. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 6, a. 1. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 3, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 2nd princ. q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 7. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 7, dubium 3.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in

Commentaries on

Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS II.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 170-173.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART II

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 170-173.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Quaestio III.

*Utrum anima rationalis sit tota in toto corpore,
et tota in qualibet parte ipsius.*

Question 3

*Whether the rational soul is whole in the whole body,
and whole in any part of it.*

T**ERTIO QUAERITUR**, utrum anima rationalis sit in toto corpore, ita quod in qualibet parte. Et quod sic, videtur.

T**HIRD THERE IS ASKED**, whether the rational soul is in the whole body, so that (it is) in any part. And it seems that (it is) so.

1. Augustinus[1] dicit, quod sicut Deus est in maiori mundo, sic anima in minori; sed Deus sic est in maiori, quod in qualibet parte totus: ergo anima sic est in minori, scilicet in corpore.

1. (St.) Augustine[1] says, that just as God is in the macrocosm [maiori mundo], so the soul in the microcosm [minori]; but God is so in the greater, that (He is) whole in any part: therefore in this manner the soul is in the lesser one, that is, in the body.

2. Item, quod dat esse toti et partibus unitur toti et partibus secundum essentiam, quia forma per sui essentiam dat esse, et hoc non nisi ei cui essentialiter unitur;[2] sed anima dat esse toti corpori et omnibus partibus: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, what gives “being” [esse] to the whole and to the parts is united to the whole and to the parts according to essence, because form through its own essence gives “being” [esse], and this (is) not (given) except to that to which it is essentially united;[2] but the soul gives “being” [esse] to the whole body and to all the parts: ergo etc..

3. Item, in oculo est videre, est sentire, est vivere.[3] Quaero ergo, utrum sint haec unus actus vel differentes. Non unus; hoc constat, quia, privato visu, adhuc sentit per tactum, privato sensu, adhuc vivit, sicut[4] in paralytico; cum ergo vivere sit a substantia, videre a potentia, in oculo est anima secundum substantiam; eadem ratione potest probari, et in omnibus partibus esse.

3. Likewise, in the eye there is seeing, there is sensing, there is living.[3] Therefore I ask, whether these are one act and/or different ones. Not one; this is established, because, deprived of sight, one still senses through touch, deprived of sensing, one still lives, just as (is clear)[4] in a paralytic; therefore since living is by a substance, seeing by a power [a potentia], the soul is in the eye according to substance; for the same reason it can be proven, that it is also in all the parts.

4. Item, anima operatur in toto corpore, ergo in toto corpore[5] est per potentiam; sed potentia animae simplex est: ergo si potentia una est in manu et pede, idem est in diversis partibus; sed non est simplicior potentia quam substantia: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, the soul operates in the whole body, therefore in the whole body[5] it is through (its) power [per potentiam]; but the power of the soul is simple: therefore if there is one power in hand and foot, the same is in diverse parts; but there is not a more simple power than a substance: ergo etc..

5. Item, anima est in corpore: aut ergo[6] est in *qualibet* parte, aut est in *una* determinate, aut est in *puncto*. Si in *qualibet* parte, habeo propositum. Si in *una*, cum illa habeat plures partes, et anima sit simplex, erit in pluribus partibus: ergo non est inconveniens, animam esse in pluribus partibus. Sed qua ratione est[7] in partibus partis, eadem ratione est in partibus totius. Si est in *puncto* corporis,[8] ergo cum punctus non habeat proportionem ad totum corpus, anima est improportionabilis toti corpori: ergo non potest esse perfectio, cum proportio sit perfectionis ad perfectibile.[9] *Similiter* « punctus est substantia posita » sive habens positionem, ergo anima habet situm in corpore; sed nulla forma situalis est motor sufficiens: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, the soul is in the body: therefore[6] either it is in *every* part, or it is in *one* determinate (part), or it is in a *point*. If in *every* part, I have (proven) the proposed. If in *one*, since that has more parts, and the soul is simple, it will be in more parts: therefore it is not inconvenient, that the soul be in more parts. But by the reason by which it is[7] in parts of a part, by the same reason it is in parts of the whole. If it is in a *point* of the body,[8] therefore since a point does not have a proportion to the whole body, the soul is improportionable to the whole body: therefore there cannot be perfection, since a proportion is of a perfection to the perfectible.[9] *Similarly* « a point is a posited substance » or one having a position, therefore the soul has a site in the body; but no situated [situalis] form is a sufficient motor (of the whole): ergo etc..

Sed contra: 1. Forma, quae est in toto et in partibus una, denominat partes et totum ratione consimili.[10] Unde quaelibet pars ignis est ignis: ergo si anima est in qualibet parte, tunc quaelibet pars animalis est animal sicut totum,[11] cum quaelibet pars sit substantia animata sensibilis.

But on the contrary: 1. A form, which is one in the whole and in the parts, denominates the parts and the whole by exactly the same reckoning [ratione consimili].[10] Whence every part of fire is fire: therefore if the soul is in every part, then every part of the animal is an animal just as the whole,[11] since every part is a sensible, animated substance.

2. Item, existentia animae rationalis non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis, cum sit fixa in se: ergo non est in qualibet.[12]

2. Likewise, the existence of the rational soul does not depend from any part of the body, since it has been fixed in itself: therefore it is not in any (part).[12]

3. Item, operatio eius non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis nec alicui communicatur: ergo in nulla parte corporis est, nec in quantum perfectio, nec in quantum motor. Unde Philosophus[13] dicit, quod « anima nullius coporis est actus », id est nullius partis corporis, sed in quo est, est sicut actus.

3. Likewise, its operation does not depend from any part of the body nor is it communicated to any: therefore it is in no part of the body, neither inasmuch as (it is) a perfection, nor inasmuch as (it is) a motor. Whence the Philosopher[13] says, that « the soul is an act of no body », that is (it belongs) to no part of the body, but in that which it is, it is just as an act.

4. Item, corpus organicum[14] est diversarum rationum in partibus et toto, ergo habet diversam perfectionem: ergo cum anima perficiat totum quantum ad essentiam, perficit partes quantum ad potentiam: ergo anima rationalis non est in partibus nisi solum

4. Likewise, the organic[14] body is for diverse reasons in the parts and whole, therefore it has a diverse perfection: therefore since the soul perfects the whole as much as regards essence, it perfects the parts as much as regards power: therefore the rational soul is not in the parts except only

---

[1] Libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 13. in fine. — Mox in propos. minore post *maiori* Vat. repetit *mundo*.
[2] Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 16. et 16. (VII. c. 6.). — De proxime sequente propositione vide II. de Anima, text. 4. seqq. et 24. (c. 1. et 2.), ac I. de Part. animal. c. 1.
[3] Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis *est*.
[4] Supple cum cod. V *patet*. — In fine argumenti post *partibus* cod. Y addit *corporis*.
[5] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 minus bene omittit *in toto corpore*.
[6] Fide plurimum mss. ut M T V W X Z etc. et ed. 1 adicimus *ergo*, et dein ter *est*.
[7] Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et paulo post minus apte omittunt *est*.
[8] Codd. aa bb addunt *ergo est punctus*.
[9] Colligitur ex dicto Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2): Videtur enim actus activorum inesse in patiente et disposito. — Et text. 26. ait, quod non videatur quodlibet (subiectum) recipere quodlibet (quamlibet formam). — Sequens definitio puncti datur ab Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6).
[10] Aristot., I. de Historia animal. c. 1.
[11] Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, licet plurimi eorum post *pars* omittant *animalis*; Vat. autem cum cod. cc, omissa particula *tunc*, pro *est animal sicut totum* ponit *dicitur animal*.
[12] Codd. W X addunt *parte*.
[13] Libr. II. de Anima, text. 11. (c. 1.) et III. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 4.).
[14] Aliqui codd. ut A I W Y *organizatum*.

[1] The book On Spirit and soul, ch. 13 at the end. — Then in the minor proposition after *the greater* [maiori] the Vatican text repeats *word* [mundo].
[2] Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, text 15 and 16. (Bk. VII, ch. 6). — On the next, following proposition, see On the Soul, Bk. II, text 4 ff and text 24 (chs. 1 and 2), and On the Parts of Animals, Bk. I, ch. 1.
[3] From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have twice supplied *there is* [est].
[4] Supply together with codex V *is clear* [patet]. — At the end of the argument after *parts* [partibus] codex Y adds *of the body* [corporis].
[5] The Vatican text without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6, omits less well *in the whole body* [in toto corpore].
[6] Trusting in very many manuscripts as M T V W X Z etc. and edition 1 we have inserted *therefore* [ergo], and then *it is* [est] three times.
[7] Very many codices together with edition 1 here and a little after this less aptly omit *it is* [est].
[8] Codices aa and bb add *therefore it is a point* [ergo est punctus].
[9] Gathered from the saying of Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 24 (ch. 2): For the act of acts seems to be within the patient and the disposed. — And in text 26 he says, that it does not seem that any (subject) receives any (form). — The following definition of a point is given by Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 68 (ch. 4) and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 12, (Bk. IV, ch. 6).
[10] Aristotle, On the History of Animals, Bk. I, ch. 1.
[11] Thus the ancient codices together with edition 1, though very many of them after *part* [pars] omit *of the animal* [animalis]; the Vatican text, moreover, together with codex cc, having omitted the particle *then* [tunc], in place of *is an animal just as the whole*

[est animal sicut totum] pluts *is said (to be) an animal* [dicitur animal].
[12] Codices W and W add *part* [parte].
[13] On the Soul, Bk. II, text 11 (ch. 1) and Bk. III, text 6 (ch. 4).
[14] Some codices as A I W and Y read *organized* [organizatum].

---

quantum ad rationem potentiae; et hoc etiam dicit Philosophus:[1] « Sicut anima ad corpus, sic partes animae ad partes corporis ».

as much as regards the reckoning of a power and this the Philosopher also says:[1] « Just as the soul (is) to the body, so the parts of the soul to the parts of the body ».

5. Item, si anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ergo tota est in manu; sed quando aliquod totum est in aliquo, movetur illo modo:[2] ergo mota manu, movetur anima, et similiter, manu quiescente, quiescit: ergo cum manus una possit moveri, altera existente in quiete, anima una possit moveri, altera existente in quiete, anima una et eadem numero simul quiescit et movetur secundum idem.

5. Likewise, if the soul is whole in every part of the body, therefore it is whole in the hand; but when any whole is in anything, it is moved in that manner:[2] therefore with the hand moved, the soul is moved, and similarly, with the hand resting, it rests: therefore since one hand can be moved, with the other existing at rest, one soul can be moved, with the other existing at rest, the soul, one and the same in number, simultaneously rests and is moved according to the same (thing).

6. Item, si anima est in pluribus partibus[3] tota, qua ratione in tribus, eadem ratione in pluribus, et ita in infinitis, et quantumcumque extendatur corpus: ergo anima nata est esse ubique, et ita videtur, quod anima non sit substantia limitata, sed immensa.

6. Likewise, if the soul is whole in more parts,[3] by the reason by which it is in three, by the same reason (it is) in more, and thus in infinite (parts), and however much the body be extended: therefore the soul is bound to be everywhere, and thus it seems, that the soul is not a limited substance, but (rather) an immense one.

7. Item, si tota anima est in manu sicut in aliis partibus: ergo cum vita sit ab[4] anima, non magis recipit motum et sensum manus a corde, quam e converso. Hoc autem est contra omnes philosophos;[5] et sequitur ex hoc tale inconveniens, quod, sicut laeso corde perit vita, ita laesa manu.

7. Likewise, if the whole soul is in the hand just as in the other parts: therefore since life is by[4] the soul, the hand does not receive more movement and sense from the heart, than conversely. But this is contrary to all philosophers;[5] and there follows from this such an inconvenient (conclusion), that, just as by a wound in the heart life perishes, so by a wound in the hand.

CONCLUSIO.

Anima rationalis est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte.

CONCLUSION

The rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in every part.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, quod anima secundum essentiam est in aliqua parte determinate, secundum potentiam vero est et influit in toto corpore, sicut aranea est in tela.[6] Unde dixerunt, quod est in corde, quia cor est domicilium vitae, et eius inhabitator est anima. Et ad hoc ponendum movit eos *experimentum* cum *defectu rationis*. *Experimentum*, quia visibiliter apparet, quod laeso corde separatur anima, et ab ipso fluit[7] sensus et motus, et est membrum nobile existens in medio, sicut centrum corporis. *Defectus rationis*, quia non potuerunt intelligere, quomodo aliquid limitatum sit unum et idem totum in pluribus; et quia fides non cogit credere, et ratio non intelligit, ideo dicunt, non esse ponendum, quod sit in toto ratione cuiuslibet partis.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that some say, that the soul according to essence is in some determinate part, but according to power it is and inflows in the whole body, just as a spider in a web.[6] Whence they said, that it is in the body, because the heart is the domicile of life, and its inhabitor is the soul. And (it was) *proof of experience* [experimentum] together with a *defect of reason* (which) moved them to posit this. *Proof of experience*, because it visibly appears, that by a wound in the heart the soul is separated, and (that) from this (organ)[7] sense and movement flow, and (that) it is the noble member existing in the middle, as the center of the body. *A defect of reason*, because they could not understand, in what manner something limited is the one and the same whole in the more; and because (our) Faith did not drive (them) to believe, and reason did not understand, for that reason they say, that it is not to be posited, that it is in the whole by reason of any part.

Sed aliorum opinio est, ut Augustini,[8] quod anima in qualibet parte corporis sit tota; et ad hoc ponendum movet *experimentum*, *exemplum* et rationabile *argumentum*. *Experimentum*, quia anima in partibus distantibus a corde ita cito sentit, sicut et in propinquis; item[9] simul quasi in ictu oculi sentit laesionem in partibus distantibus, et cum anima separatur, dolor est in singulis partibus et resolutio. *Exemplum* similiter movet, sicut dicit Augustinus:[10] « Videmus enim quod uno animali perfecte sano est una sanitas in singulis partibus, nec maior in maiori nec minor in minori ». Si ergo hoc est in forma corporali, quanto magis, in spirituali? Rationis *argumentum* movet, quia anima est *forma simplex* et *motor sufficiens*. Quia *forma* totalis corporis, est in toto; quia vero *simplex*, non est secundum partem et partem sui; quia *motor sufficiens*, ideo non habet situm, et ideo nec est in puncto nec in parte determinata. Et quia magis rationalis est opinio, quae fundatur supra[11] rationem, quam quae fundatur supra defectus rationis, et quia Augustinus hoc dicit, hanc approbo tanquam meliorem.

But the opinion of others is, as (St.) Augustine's,[8] that the soul in any part of the body is whole; and *proof of experience*, *example* and a reasonable *argument* move to posit this. *Proof of experience*, because the soul in parts distant from the heart senses as [ita] swiftly, as (it does) even in near ones; likewise[9] simultaneously as if in the twinkling of an eye [in ictu oculi] it senses a wound in distant parts, and when the soul is separated, there is pain in the individual [singulis] parts and a release [resolutio]. *Example* similarly moves, just as (St.) Augustine says:[10] « For we see that in one, perfect, healthy animal there is one health in the individual parts, neither greater in the greater nor lesser in the lesser ». Therefore if this is in a corporal form, how much more, in the spiritual? An *argument* of reason moves, because the soul is a *simple form* and a *sufficient motor*. Because (it is) the *form* of the whole body, it is in the whole; but because (it is) *simple*, it is not (there) according to a part and (there is not) a part of itself; because (it is) a *sufficient motor*, for that reason it does not have a site, and for that reason neither is it

in a point nor in a determinate part. And because more reasonable is the opinion, which is founded upon[11] reason, than that which is founded upon defects of reason, and because (St.) Augustine says this, this I approve as the better one.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: forma quae est in toto etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est genus formae. Est enim *quaedam*, quae *perficit* et *extenditur* et *dependet*. Et haec, quia totum perficit, est in toto; quia vero extenditur, perfectionem totius communicat partibus; quia vero dependet nec agit per se, operationem totius communicat partibus, ut patet in forma ignis, quia quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et quaelibet calefacit. Est *alia*[12] *forma*, quae *perficit* et *dependet*, sed *non extenditur*; et ta- / -lis forma . . .

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary: a form which is in the whole etc.; it must be said, that threefold is the genus of form. For there is a *certain* one, which *perfects* and *is extended* and *does depend*. And this one, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole; but because it is extended, it communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; but because it depends neither does it act through itself, (but) it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts, as is clear in the form of fire, because any part of the fire is fire and any heats. There is *another*[12] *form*, which *perfects* and *depends*, but *is not extended*; and su- / -ch a form

---

[1] Libr. II. de Anima, text. 9. (c. 1.).
[2] Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. ad opp. 3.
[3] Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, hic omittit *partibus* et in fine argumenti *substantia*, ac contra plures codd. ut F H T V Y etc. ponit *ea ratione* loco *eadem ratione*.
[4] Aliqui codd. ut A C G I R S omittunt *ab*. Cod. T *cum una sit anima*. Codd. L O *sit anima vel ab anima*.
[5] Vide Aristot., III. de Partib. animal. c. 3. et 4.
[6] Chalcidius, qui vixit sub initio IV. saec., in Platonis Timaeum (ed. Lipsiae, 1876, cura Dr. Ioh. Wrobel. pag. 296. n. CCXX.): Sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia, ut cum quid ex bestiolis plagas incurrerit ex quacumque parte de proximo sentiat, sic animae principale positum in media sede cordis, sensuum exordia retinere, ut cum quid nuntiabunt, de proximo recognoscat. — Vat. *fluit* pro *influit*. Mox post *quia* cod. K addit *sicut dicitur in libro de Motu cordis*. Vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 1. (in aliis edd. q. 91.). — De hac opinione cfr. Greg. Nyssen., de Hominis opificio, c. 12.
[7] Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *fluit* loco *influit*. — De cordis principatu vide Aristot., III. de Partibu. animal. c. 4.
[8] Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8; et de Immort. animae c. 16. n. 25; ac de Origine animae hom. (epist. 166.) n. 4; necnon contra Epist. Manichaei c. 16. n. 20. — Mox nonnulli codd. modo inverso *ad hoc movendum ponit*, codd. L O *ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum ponit*; sed cum subnexis haec lectio non cohaeret. Dein plures codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *rationale* pro *rationabile*. De differentia horum cfr. August., II. de Ordine, ch. 11. n. 31. seq.
[9] Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et edd. 1, 6,

[1] On the Soul, Bk. II, text 9 (ch. 1).
[2] See above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, ad opp. 3.
[3] The Vatican text together with codex cc, but disagreeing with the other codices and edition 1, here omits *parts* [partibus] and at the end of the argument *substance* [substantia], and contrary to very many codices as F H Y V Y etc. it puts *by that reason* [ea ratione] in place of *by the same reason* [eadem ratione].
[4] Some codices as A C G I R S omit *by* [ab]. Codex T reads *since the soul is one* [cum una sit anima]. Codices L and O read *is the soul and/or by the soul* [sit anima vel ab anima].
[5] See Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, Bk. III, chs. 3 and 4.
[6] Chalcidius, who lived at the start of the fourth century, On the Timaeus of Plato (ed. Liepzig, 1876, Dr. Iohannes Wrobel, editor, p. 296, n. CCXX): Just as the spider in the midst of a web holds all the warp of filaments with its feet, so that when any of the little beasts run into the trap it senses from nearby (that which is) out of any part whatsoever, so the soul's principle placed in the middle seat of the heart recognizes from nearby that it retains the warp of the senses, when for example they announce anything. — The Vatican text has *flows* [fluit] in place of *inflows* [influit]. Then after *because* [quia] codex K adds *just as is said in the book On the Movement of the heart*. See Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 87, m. 2, a. 1, § 1 (in other editions q. 91). — On this opinion cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, On the work of man, ch. 12.
[7] From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *flows* [fluit] in place of *inflows* [influit]. — On the principality of the heart see Aristotle, On the

repetit hic *quia*. Cod. W *et ita*, cod. X *et* loco *item*, aliqui codd. vero ut F T particulam *et* addunt non male post *simul*.

10 Libr. de Praesentia Dei seu Epistol. 187. c. 4. n. 13: Qualitas vero corporis, quae sanitas dicitur, cum sanum corpus est totum, tanta est in maioribus, quanta in minoribus partibus. Non enim quae minus magnae sunt, ideo minus sanae sunt, aut quae ampliores, ideo saniores. — Ex anitquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *uno*.

11 Ed. 1 hic et paulo post *super*. Aliqui codd. ut V Y cum ed. 1 *defectum* loco *defectus*. Dein fide plurimorum mss. et sex primarum edd. post *rationis* addidimus *et*, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.

12 Nonnulli codd. ut A B D E G P T Y W *autem* pro *alia*; cod. I *autem alia*.

Parts of Animals, Bk. III, ch. 4.

8 On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 6, n. 8; and On the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 16, n. 25; and On the Origin of the Soul, homily (epistle 166), n. 4; and also Against the Letter of Manichaeus, ch. 16, n. 20. — Then not a few codices in an inversed manner read *posited (them) to move this* [ad hoc movendum ponit], codices L and O have *posited (them) to demonstrate and/or move this* [ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum]; but this reading is not coherent with the subjoined. Then very many codices as A F G I K T etc. together withe editions 1, 2 and 3 read *rational* [rationale] in place of *reasonable* [rationabile]. On the difference of these, cf. Augustine, On Order, Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 31 ff.

9 The Vatican text, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and editions 1 and 6, repeats here *because* [quia]. Codex W has *and thus* [et ita], codex X has *and* [et] in place of *likewise* [item], but some codices as F and T do not badly add the particle *and* [et] after *simultaneously* [simul].

10 The book On the Presence of God (Epistle 187), ch. 4, n. 13: However the quality of a body, which is said (to be its) health, when the whole body is healthy, is as much in the greater, as it is in the lesser parts. For, (it is) not (that) those which are less great, are for that reason less healthy, or (that) those which are more ample, (are) for that reason more healthy. — From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *one* [uno}.

11 Edition 1 here and a little after this has *above* [super]. Some codices as V and Y together with edition 1 have *a defect* [defectum] in place of *defects* [defectus]. Then trusting in very many manuscripts and six of the first editions after *of reason* [rationis] we have added the *and* [et], which the Vatican text has less well omitted. [Trans. Note: a corollary to the previous sentence would be: since the possessing spirits are not the sufficient motor nor the essential form of any body, for that reason a body under diabolical possession must be inhabited by them in one or more sites of the body.]

12 Not a few of the codices as A B D E G P T Y and W have *moreover* [autem] in place of *another* [alia]; codex I has *moreover another* [autem alia].

---

p. 172

ta- / -lis forma, quia totum perficit, est insu- toto et qualibet parte; quia vero non extenditur, ideo actum[1] totius non attribuit partibus; quia vero dependet, operationem totius communicat partibus; et talis est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis, quia nulla pars animalis est animal, tamen qualibet pars animalis vivit et sentit. Est *iterum*[2] *forma*, quae totum *perficit*, tamen *nec extenditur nec dependet* quantum ad

/ -ch a form, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole and in any part; but because it is not extended, for that reason it does not attribute the act[1] of the whole to the parts; but because it depends, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; and such is the vegetable and sensible soul, because no part of an animal is an animal, however any part of an animal lives and senses. There is *again* a[2] *form*,

operationem; et talis, quia perfectio est, est in toto et partibus; quia vero non extenditur, perfectionem totius non communicat partibus; quia non dependet, ideo[3] nec operationem communicat; et talis est anima rationalis, quia nulla pars hominis est homo, et nulla pars hominis intelligit. Tamen etsi non communicet[4] actum totius *ut toti*, communicat *ut partibus*; quia quaelibet pars est pars hominis et vivificatur a perfectione hominis; et ideo perfectio hominis est in qualibet parte.

which *perfects* the whole, however, *it is neither extended nor does it depend* as much as regards operation; and such a one, because it is the perfection (of the whole), is in the whole and the parts; but because it is not extended, it does not communicate the perfection of the whole to the parts; (and) because it does not depend, for that reason[3] neither does it communicate the operation; and such is the rational soul, because no part of a man is a man, and no part of a man understands. However, even if it does not communicate (to a part or parts)[4] the act of the whole *as to the whole*, it does communicate (it) *as to the parts*; because any part is a part of a man and is vivified by the perfection of the man; and for that reason the perfection of a man is in any part.

3. Et sic patet responsio ad illud, quod nullius corporis est actus; quia nulli parti corporis[5] communicat propriam operationem nec perfectionem totius, tamen omnes partes perficit in toto. *Similiter* ad aliud de forma, quia forma, quae est in partibus, non denominat similiter[6] totum et partes, nisi sit forma dependens et extensa; et loquor hic de forma substantiali tantum, non de accidentali.

3. And thus is clear the response to that, that of no body is it the act; because to no part of the body[5] does it communicate its proper operation nor the perfection of the whole, however, it does perfect all the parts in the whole. *Similarly* to the other concerning form, because the form, which is in the parts, does not denominate in a similar manner[6] the whole and the parts, unless it be a dependent and extended form; and I speak of a substantial form only, not of an accidental one.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non sunt eiusdem rationis totum et partes; dicendum, quod in partibus est considerare *organizationem* et *complexionem*. Ratione complexionis sunt uniformes toti et sunt dispositae ad idem genus vitae et perficiuntur ab uno; ratione[7] organizationis sunt diversae et perficiuntur a potentiis.

4. To that which is objected, that the whole and the parts do not belong to the same reckoning; it must be said, that it is in the parts that one considers *organization* and *complexion*. By reason of (their) complexion they are uniform to the whole and have been disposed to the same genus of life and are perfected by the powers (of the soul) [a potentiis].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[8] movetur, mota manu etc.; dicendum, quod perfectio potest super totum perfectibile et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad potentiam; et cum anima sit perfectio totius corporis, super totum potest, et ideo nullo minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia nec potentia; definitur autem corpore suo, quod perficit, et ideo corpore moto, movetur per consequens; partibus

5. To that which is objected, that (the soul)[8] is moved, with the hand moved etc.; it must be said, that perfection can (be) over the whole perfectible both as much as regards the substance and as much as regards a power; and since the soul is the perfection of the whole body, it can be over the whole, and for no less a reason, than there is a whole body, it is defined by its substance and not by (its) power; moreover it is

autem non definitur, quia sunt minores toto, et ita est in una, quod est extra illam.[9] Et ideo, quia in nulla parte est definitive, non movetur ad motum alicuius partis, sicut nec Deus movetur ad motum alicuius creaturae.

defined by its own body, which it perfects, and for that reason with the body moved, it is consequently [per consequens] moved; moreover by its parts it is not defined, because they are less than the whole, and thus there is in the one (soul), that which is outside it.[9] And for that reason, because it is in no part definitively, it is not moved according to [ad] the movement of any part, just as God is neither moved according to the movement of any creature.

6. Et per hoc patet sequens, quia totum corpus comparatur ipsi animae tanquam unus locus; et ideo in pluribus partibus non est nisi in quantum in uno loco; unde si separentur, non erit in illis. Nec sequitur ex hoc, quod sit infinita, quia « omnium natura constantium terminus est et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti »,[10] et ita corporis humani. Unde potest cogitari tam magnum corpus, quod non posset vivificari ab anima.

6. And through this the following is clear, because the whole body is compared to the soul itself as one place; and for that reason it is not in more parts except inasmuch as (it is) in one place; whence if they be separated, it will not be in them. Nor does it follow from this, that (the soul) is infinite, because « of all constant things nature is the term and the reason for (their) magnitude and increase [augmenti] »,[10] and thus of the human body. Whence there can be thought a body so great, that it could not be vivified by the soul.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod tunc una pars non recipit ab alia; dicendum, quod sicut Deus in maiore mundo immediate est in omni creatura ipsam continens, tamen per[11] ordinem universi influit aliquid una creatura in aliam; sic intelligendum, quod anima per sui praesentiam est in qualibet parte immediate, quam continet et conservat, non tamen omnino, sed influit in omnes partes per unam; et ideo cessante illa parte et eius influentia, perit ordo corporis essentialis, et ita anima separatur.

7. To that which is objected last, that then one part does not receive from an other; it must be said, that just as God in the macrocosm is immediately in every creature as the One containing it, however, through[11] the order of the universe something inflows by one creature into another; so it must be understood, that the soul through its own presence is immediately in any part, which it contains and conserves, not however entirely, but it inflows in all parts through one; and for that reason with that part and its influence ceasing, the essential order of the body perishes, and thus the soul is separated.

SCHOLION.

I. Propositio in arg. 1. ad opp., quod forma aliqua denominat partes et totum, vera est, quando agitur de rebus organizatione carentibus, quarum partes sunt proinde omnino homogeneae; sed falissime applicatur ad corpora organizata, sicut fit in illo sophismate Buridani ad probandum digitum hominis esse hominem. Triplici illa

SCHOLIUM

I. The proposition in argument 1 ad opp., that some form denominates the parts and the whole, is true, when one deals with things lacking organization, the parts of which are for that reason [proinde] entirely homogeneous; but in a most false manner it is applied to organized bodies, just as is done in that sophism of Buridanus to prove

distinctione formarum S. Doctor ad 1. istam difficultatem iam solvit.

II. Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 5. hoc notandum. Anima vocatur perfectio totius corporis et corpus perfectibile, quia secundum Aristotelem anima, ut forma substantialis, est actus corporis, unde « super totum potest », i. e. per substantiam suam potest totum corpus vivificare et per potentiam movere. Hoc tamen non excludit, quod magis infuat in organa principaliora, uti explicatur in solut. ad 7. Verba: « Ideo nulli minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia », sensum habent, quod anima sit in toto corpore modo *definitivo*, ut nunc dicitur, non *circumscriptivo*. Esse in loco *circumscriptive* dicitur, quando totum locatum est in toto loco, et pars locati in parte loci; quando vero aliquid determinatur quidem ad aliquem locum, ut naturaliter non possit simul esse in alio,

that the finger of a man is a man. With that threefold distinction of forms the Seraphic Doctor already solves that difficulty of his.

II. For an understanding of the solution to n. 5 this must be noted. The soul is called the perfection of the whole body and the perfectible body, because according to Aristotle the soul, as the substantial form, is the act of the body, whence « it can be above the whole », i. e. through its own substance it can vivify the whole body and move (it) through (its) power. However this does not exclude, that it inflows more in the more principle organs, as is explained in the solution to n. 7. The words: « For no less a reason, that there is a whole body, it is defined by its substance », has the sense, that the soul is in the whole body in a *definitive* manner, which is now called, *non-circumscriptive*. To be in a place *circumscriptively* is said, when the located whole is in the whole place, and a part of the (thing) located (is) in a part of the place; however when something is indeed determined as regards some place, that it naturally cannot simultaneously be in another,

---

[1] Aliqui codd. ut D G T ff addunt *sive perfectionem*.
[2] Codd. P Q adiiciunt *tertia*.
[3] Multi codd. ut A C E G H I O R S T U V Y Z ff cum ed. 1 omiitunt *ideo*.
[4] Subaudi: parti vel partibus. — Multi codd. ut A C E G L R S U V Y Z cc ff falso post *etsi* omittunt *non*; fere omnes tamen codd. contra Vat. habent *communicet* pro *communicat*. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *est part* ac post *hominis* prticulam *et*.
[5] Ex codd. H Y supplevimus *parti corporis*, certe saltem subaudiendum. Ed. 1 vero paulo ante post *nullius* addit *partis*. Sensus responsionis redditur facilior, si ponatur: quia, etsi nulli parti etc. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1. substituimus *tamen* loco *cum* et *perficit* pro *perficiat*.
[6] Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 *simul* pro *similiter*; cod. I *similiter et*.
[7] Cod. V addit *vero*.
[8] Supple cum cod. E: *anima*.
[9] Antiquam lectionem mss. et ed. 1 restituimus ponendo *quod est extra illam* loco *quod non est extra aliam*. Paulo ante cod. W particulae *ita* praefigit *ideo*. — De hac solutione cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 64. (c. 4.).
[10] Libr. II. de Anima, text. 41. (c. 4).). — Immediate post corrupta et falsa lectio Vat. et cod. cc *et ita corpus humanum non potest* resarcitur ex aliis mss. et ed. 1. Mox multorum codd. ut A F G H K T etc. et

[1] Some codices as D G T and ff add *or perfection* [sive perfectionem].
[2] Codices P and Q insert *third* [tertia].
[3] Many codices as A C E G H I O R S T U V Y Z and ff together with edition 1 omit *for that reason* [ideo].
[4] Understand: to a part and/or parts. — Many codices as A C E G L R S U V Y Z cc and ff after *even if* [etsi] falsely omit *not* [non]; nearly all the codices, however, contrary to the Vatican text, have the subjunctive *communicate* [communicet] in place of *communicates* [communicat]. Then the Vatican text together with codex cc, but disagreeing with the other codices together with edition 1, omits *is a part* [est pars] and after *of a man* [hominis] the particle *and* [et].
[5] From codices H and Y we have supplied *part of the body* [parti coporis], which certainly must be understood. Edition 1, however, a little before this, reads *of no part of a body* [nullius partis corporis]. The sense of the response is rendered easier, if one puts it: "because, even if to no part" etc.. Then trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *however* [tamen] in place of *since* [cum] and the indicative *it perfects* [perficit] in place of the subjunctive *it perfects* [perficiat].
[6] The Vatican text not trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, has *simultaneously* [simul] in place of *similarly* [similiter]; codex I reads *similarly also* [similiter et].

ed. 1 auctoritate substituimus *posset* loco *possit*.
[11] Unus alterve codex ut I cum ed. 1 non male *secundum* loco *per*. Mox codd. O Z *ab* pro *aliquid*.

[7] Codex V adds *however* [vero].
[8] Supply together with codex E: *the soul* [anima].
[9] The ancient reading of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored by putting *what is outside it* [quod est extra illam] in place of *what is not outside another* [quod non est extra aliam]. A little before this codex W prefaces the particle *thus* [ita] with *for that reason* [ideo]. — On this solution, cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 64 (ch. 4).
[10] On the Soul, Bk. II, text 41 (ch. 4). — Immediately after this, the corrupt and false reading of the Vatican text and of codex cc, *and thus the human body cannot(be)* [et ita corpus humanum non potest], is repaired from the other manuscripts and edition 1. Then on the authority of many codices as A F G H K T etc. and edition 1, we have substituted *could* [posset] in place of *can* [possit].
[11] One or the other codex as I together with edition 1 reads not badly *according to* [secundum] in place of *through* [per].

---

p. 173

et insuper, ut sit totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte loci, tunc dicitur esse *definitive* in loco.

and in addition, that it is whole in the whole and whole in every part of the place, then it is said to be *definitively* in the place.

III. Circa conclusionem omnibus communem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 64. — Scot., De rer. princ. q. 12. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 5, a. 3; S. I. q. 76. a. 8; S. c. Gent. II. c. 72. — B. Albert., hic a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Richard. a. Med., hic. a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. post medium. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 16. q. unic. dub. 4.

III. About the conclusion common to all, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II. q. 64. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, On the Principle of Things, q. 12, a. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 5, a. 3; Summa., I, q. 76, a. 8; Summa against the Gentiles, II, ch. 72. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 26. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 6, a. 2. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 4, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in 2nd. princ., q. 3. — Durandus, here in q. 3. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 7 after the middle. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, q. sole, dubium 4.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS II.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio IV.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 173-174.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART II

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 4

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 173-174.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Quaestio IV.

Utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere sive praedicamento.

QUARTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in aliquo *determinato* genere. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quod distinguitur ab aliis entibus, est aliqua natura determinata; sed Deus est huiusmodi, quia distinguitur a creaturis omnibus, quia nullum creatum est Deus: ergo est natura determinata; sed quod est natura determinata est in genere determinato:[1] ergo etc.

2. Item, quod habet superius univocum et essentiale, habet esse in genere determinato; sed Deus habet superius se,[2] ut substantiam, quae dicitur de Deo et creaturis et essentialiter et univoce, quia secundum istam rationem quae est, *res per*

Question 4

Whether God is in any determinate genus or predicament.

FOURTH AND LAST there is asked, whether God is in any *determinate* genus. And that (it is) so, is shown in this manner:

1. What is distinguished from other beings, is some determinate nature; but God is of this kind, because He is distinguished from all creatures, because no created (thing) is God: therefore He is a determinate nature; but what is a determinate nature is in a determinate genus:[1] ergo etc..

2. Likewise, what has a univocal and essential superior, has “being” [esse] in a determinate genus; but God has a superior to Himself,[2] as the substance, which is said of God and creatures both essentially and univocally, because according to that

se existens: ergo etc.

reckoning of Him which is '*a thing existing through itself*' [res per se existens]: ergo etc..

3. Item, quod sit in *quolibet genere*, videtur. Quia omne, quod est completionis[3] in creatura, attribuendum est Deo; sed omne praedicamentum habet aliquid completionis: ergo res omnium praedicamentorum sunt in Deo; sed quidquid est in Deo est Deus, et e converso:[4] ergo Deus essentialiter subiicitur rei omnis praedicamenti: ergo est in quolibet.

3. Likewise, it seems that He is in *any genus*. Because everything, which belongs to completion[3] in a creature, must be attributed to God; but every predicament has something of completion: therefore the qualities [res] of all predicaments are in God; but whatever is in God is God, and conversely:[4] therefore God essentially is the subject [subiicitur] of the predicament of every thing [rei omnis]: therefore He is in any (of them).

4. Item, summo bono nihil deficit de bonitate: ergo summo enti nihil[5] de entitate: ergo in Deo est omnis entitas et omnis differentia entitatis: ergo cum differentiae entium sint decem praedicamenta, omnia sunt in Deo.

4. Likewise, to the Most High Good there is nothing of goodness lacking: therefore to the Most High Being [summo enti] (there is) nothing[5] of entity (lacking): therefore in God there is every entity and every difference of entity: therefore since of the difference of beings there are ten predicaments, all are in God.

Contra: 1. Augustinus in libro quinto de Trinitate:[6] « Deus est bonus sine qualitate, magnus sine quantitate »: ergo magnitudo Dei non est in genere quantitatis nec bonitas in genere qualitatis: ergo nec substantia in genere substantiae: ergo in nullo est[7] genere.

On the contrary: 1. (St.) Augustine (says) in the fifth book On the Trinity:[6] « God is good without quality, great without quantity »: therefore the magnitude of God is not in the genus of quantity nor (is His) goodness in the genus of quality: therefore neither (is His) substance in the genus of substance: therefore He is[7] in no genus.

2. Item, videtur quod non est in genere *determinato*; quia omne, quod est in genere determinato, habet esse finitum et limitatum; Deus autem est infinitus: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that He is not in a *determinate* genus; because everything, which is in a determinate genus, has a finite and limited "being" [esse]; but God is infinite: ergo etc..

3. Item, quod non in *quolibet* genere, videtur, quia quod habet in se res plurium generum est compositum: Deus autem est simplicissimus: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that He is not in *any* genus, because, what has in itself that which pertains to [res] more genera is a composite: but God is most simple: ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Deus nec est in aliquo determinato genere, nec in pluribus.

CONCLUSION

God is neither in any determinate genus, nor in more.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod non convenit Deo esse in *uno genere determinato*, quia omne tale habet esse limitatum et arctatum et compositum. In *pluribus*[8] *generibus* non potest esse. Aut enim aliquid est in pluribus propter naturarum et proprietatum *diversitatem*, ut album, in quantum dicit subiectum aliquod sive rem albam, est in genere substantiae, sed in quantum dicit formam, quae est *albedo*, est in praedicamento qualitatis; aut propter *generalitatem*, sicut unum et ens.[9]

I RESPOND: It must be said, that it is not fitting [convenit] for God to be in *one determinate genus*, because every such has a limited and constrained [arctatum] and composite "being" [esse]. In *more*[8] genera He cannot be. For either something is in more on account of *diversity* of natures and properties, as "white", inasmuch as it means some subject or white thing, it is in the genus of substance, but inasmuch as it means the form, which is *whiteness*, it is in the predicament of quality; or (it is such) on account of *generality*, just as 'one' and 'being' [unum et ens].[9]

Propter naturarum *multiformitatem*[10] non potest Deus esse in pluribus, quia omne tale compositum est et multiforme, Deus autem simplex. Non propter *generalitatem*, quia ens tale nihil est habens[11] distinctum a rebus creatis. Deus autem est habens in se ens distinctum a rebus, et habens esse simplex et infinitum; et ideo nec in uno genere nec in pluribus esse potest.

On account of a *multiformity*[10] of natures God cannot be in more, because every such is composite and in a multiform manner, but God (is) simple. Not on account of *generality*, because such a being [ens] is as one having[11] nothing distinct from created things. But God is the One having in Himself a being-distinct-from-things [ens distinctum a rebus], and the One having a simple and infinite "being" [esse]; and for that reason He can be neither in one genus nor in more.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod distinguitur ab aliis, est natura distincta etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si distinguatur per aliquid, quod ipsum[12] contrahat et arctet, sicut per differentiam cadentem in genere; Deus autem non sic distinguitur, sed se ipso.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that what is distinguished from others, is a distinct nature etc.; it must be said, that it is true, if it is distinguished through something, which contracts and constrains it[12], just as through a difference falling in a genus; but God is not distinguished in this manner, but (rather) by His very Self.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus habet superius univocum; dicendum, quod Deo non est superius, quia[13] non est simplicius; nec univocum,

2. To that which is objected, that God has a univocal superior; it must be said, that for God there is not a superior, because[13] there is not a more simple one (than He); nor a univocal (one),

---

[1] Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. in princ., ubi quinque a Scholasticis communiter receptae conditiones pro eo quod aliquid ponatur in genere determinato assignantur, scil. quod sit univoum, quod sit ens incomplexum seu ens per se unum, quod sit ens reale, quod sit universale vel particular, quod sit ens finitum seu quid determinabile ad specialem modum entis.
[2] Plures codd. ut A B D F G K S T etc. cum ed. 1 *re* loco *se*.
[3] Hoc est, perfectionis. — Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 15.

[1] Cf. Aristotle, <u>On Predicaments</u>, at the beginning, where the five conditions commonly received by the Scholastics for which reason something is posited in a determinate genus are assigned, namely,. that which is univocal, that which is an uncomplex being or a being <u>per se</u> one, that which is a real being, that which is universal and/or particular, that which is a finite being or which is determinable according to a special manner of a being.
[2] Very many codices as A B D F G K S T etc. together with edition 1 have *as a thing* [re] in place of *to Himself* [se].

[4] Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 4, et Alan. ab Insul., Regul. theolog., reg. 9.
[5] Cod. V et ed. 1 repetunt hic *deficit*.
[6] Cap. 1. n. 2: Ut sic intelligamus Deum . . . sine qualitate bonum, since quantitate magnum.
[7] Ex aniquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *est*.
[8] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. addit *etiam*.
[9] Quae, sicut et *res*, *aliquid*, *verum*, *bonum* propter maximam universalitatem, qua in omnibus generibus implicatur, vocantur *transcendentalia*.
[10] Vat. *multiplicitatem*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
[11] Unus alterve codex ut E V omittit *habens*.
[12] Cod. V *rationem* loco *ipsum*.
[13] Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *eo*, et paulo post substituimus *illa* pro *substantiae*.

[3] That is, to perfection. — Cf. (St.) Anselm, Monologium., ch. 15.
[4] Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 4, and Alan of the Isle, Rules for Theology, rule 9.
[5] Codex V and edition 1 here repeat *there is . . . lacking* [deficit].
[6] Chapter 1, n. 2: That thus we may understand God . . . without quality good, without quantity great.
[7] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *He is* [est].
[8] The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions adds *even* [etiam].
[9] Which, just as *thing* [res], *something* [aliquid], *the true* [verum], *the good* [bonum] on account of the greatest universality, by which they are implied in all genera, are called the *transcendentals*.
[10] The Vatican text reads *multiplicity* [multiplicitatem], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
[11] One or the other codex as E and V omit *one having* [habens].
[12] Codex V has *the reckoning* [rationem] in place of *it* [ipsum].
[13] Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged here the added *for that reason* [eo], and a little after this we have substituted *that* [illa] for *a substance's* [substantiae].

---

p. 174

quia illa ratio non convenit uniformiter creaturae et Creatori. Deus enim est *ens per se*, quia nullo egens; creatura est *ens per se*, quia non est in alio ut in subiecto, eget tamen alio ad sui concervationem.

because that reckoning does not uniformly befit creature and Creator. For God is a *being through Himself* [ens per se], because (He is as one) needing nothing; a creature is a *being through itself*, because it is not in another as in a subject, however, it does need another for its own conservation.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne, quod est perfectionis et bonitatis, ponendum est in Deo; dicendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel per[1] *diversitatem*, et hoc facit esse in diversis generibus; vel secundum omnimodam *unitatem*, et hoc facit esse extra omne genus.

3. To that which is objected, that everything, which belongs to perfection and goodness, must be posited in God; it must be said, that this can be in a twofold manner: through[1] *diversity*, and this causes it to be in diverse genera; and/or according to an omnimodal *unity*, and this causes it to be outside every genus.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo dicitur, quod Deus nihil deficit de bonitate; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur non deficiens a bonitate propter hoc, quod omnis differentia boni particularis sit in Deo per *differentiam*, sed quia est in eo per *aequivalentiam*.[2] Quia enim est summum bonum, complectitur in se bonum omne; sic intelligendum est de

4. To that which is last objected, that God lacks nothing of goodness; it must be said, that God it not said (to be) deficient in goodness on account of this, that every difference of particular good is in God through *difference*, but because it is in Him through *equivalence*.[2] For because He is the Most High Good, He embraces in Himself

entitate; et sic patet illud.

every good; thus it must be understood concerning entity; and thus that (objection) is clear.

SCHOLION.

I. *Genus determinatum*, de quo est quaestio, est genus logicum seu praedicamentum, quod praedicatur de pluribus specie differentibus, v. g. substantia. — Aliqui Nominales, ut Gregorius Ariminensis, contra communem et veram sententiam affirmarunt, Deum esse in genere substantiae. Quaestionem S. Doctor duplici conclusione solvit docendo, Deum nec esse in *uno* determinato genere, nec esse in *pluribus* simul. Quod non sit in *pluribus*, probat per partes: cum enim duplici modo aliquid esse possit in pluribus praedicamentis, neuter modus Deo convenit. Primus modus patet ex littera; secundum modus est « *propter generalitatem*, sicut unum et ens ». Quod ut intelligatur, sciendum, quod *ens*, *unum*, *verum*, *bonum* vocantur transcendentia, quia ita ponuntur in omnibus praedicamentis, ut praedicentur quidem de eis, sed non sint aliquod praediamentum. Non enim haec transcendentia esse habent distinctum a praedicamentis, in quibus ponuntur, v. g. *ens* in pradicamento substantiae est substantia, in praedicamento quantitatis est quantitas. Unde hic modus minime convenit Deo, qui habet esse omnino determinatum et distinctum a rebus. Hac doctrina eliditur pantheismus.

SCHOLIUM

I. The *determinate genus*, which this question concerns, is the logical genus or predicament, which is predicated of the very many things, differing in species, e.g. "substance". — Some Nominalists, as Gregory of Rimini, affirmed against the common and true sentence, that God is in the genus of substance. The Seraphic Doctor solves this question with a twofold conclusion by teaching, that God is neither in *one* determinate genus, nor is He simultaneously in *more*. That He is not in *more*, he proves through parts: for since in a twofold manner something can be in more predicaments, neither manner befits God. The first manner is clear from the text; the second manner is « *on account of generality*, just as 'one' and 'being' [ens] ». Which to understand, it must be known, that '*being*' [ens], *the One*, *the True*, *the Good* are called transcendentals [transcendentia], because they are so posited in all predicaments, that they are indeed predicated of them, but are not any predicament. For these transcendentals do not have a "being" [esse] distinct from the predicaments, in which they are posited, e.g. a *being* [ens] in the predicament of substance is a substance, in the predicament of quantity it is a quantity. Whence in this manner it least of all befits God, who has a "being" [esse] entirely determinate and distinct from things. With this doctrine pantheism is refuted.

II. Solutio ad 1. eruitur ex distinctione inter naturam determinatam per *aliquam differentiam*, et determinatam per *se ipsam*; in primo casu differentia contrahit genus ad aliquam speciem, quae est in aliquo praedicamento; tunc et ipsa natura, sic determinata, est in hoc praedicamento. Aliter dicendum de Deo, qui est actus purissimus, determinatus *per se* et ideo extra omne praedicamentum. Cfr. Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

II. The solution to n. 1 is derived from the distinction between a nature determinate through *some difference*, and one determinate through *its very self*; in the first case the difference contracts the genus to some species, which is in some predicament; then even the nature itself, thus determinate, is in this predicament. Otherwise there must be said of God, who is the most pure Act, that (He is) determinate *through Himself* and for that reason (is)

outside every predicament. Cf. Richard of Middletown, here in q. 2.

III. Quoad rem principalem antiqui doctores consentiunt. De sententia S. Thomae, qui in Commentar. (hic q. 4. a. 2.), paulo aliter loquitur quam in Summa (I. q. 3. a. 5. 7.), cfr. Caietanus ad ult. locum. — Scot. (hic q. 3. n. 20.) non conclusionem, sed tantum eam rationem oppugnat, quae a S. Thom. ex hoc eruitur, quod Deus omnium generum perfectiones in se continet. Tamen Scot. (loc. cit. n. 16.) putat, rationem *entis* Deo et creaturis *univoce* convenire, quod quomodo cohaereat cum aliis doctrinis Scoti varie a Scotistis explicatur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 32; S. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 3. in fine. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 26. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 1. 2.

III. In regard to the principle matter the ancient doctors agree. On the sentence of St. Thomas, who in his Commentaria, here in q. 4, a. 2, speaks in a manner slightly different that in the Summa., I, q. 3, aa. 5 and 7, cf. Cajetan on this passage. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 3, n. 20, opposes not the conclusion, but only that reason, which is derived by St. Thomas from this, that God contains in Himself the perfections of all genera. Scotus, however, loc. cit., n. 16, thinks, that the reckoning of *a being* befits God and creatures *univocally*, which, how this is coherent with the other doctrines of Scotus, is explained in various manners by the Scotists. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, aa. 2 and 3. Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 32; Summa., tr. 4, q. 20, m. 3 at the end. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 5, a. 2. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 4, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 26. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 6. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in qq. 1 and 2.

[1] Codd. V X *secundum*, et paulo infra cod. T *uniformitatem* loco *unitatem*.
[2] Hoc est, per eminentiam seu eminenter.

[1] Codices V and X read *according to* [secundum], and a little below this codex T has *uniformity* [uniformitatem] in place of *unity* [unitatem].
[2] That is, through eminence or eminently.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of

Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS II.
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART II
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 174-176.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 174-176.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

DUB. I.

In parte ista circa litteram incidit hic[3] quaestio de *ordine*. Cum enim *compositio* in creatura sit ratio et causa mutationis, *simplicitas* est causa immutabilitatis; quia si affirmatio est causa affirmationis, et negatio causa negationis:[4] ergo cum causa sit ante effectum, debuit primo Magister ponere proprietatem simplicitatis.

DOUBT I

In that part of his there occurs here[3] the question concerning the *order* of the text [circa litteram . . . de ordine]. For since *composition* in a creature is the reason and cause for mutation, *simplicity* is the cause of immutability; because if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, and negation the cause of negation:[4] therefore since cause is before effect, Master (Peter) ought first to posit the property of simplicity.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod revera compositio secundum rationem intelligendi prior est quam mutatio; sed quoniam negationes se habent e contrario affirmationibus, hinc est, quod immutabilitas est prior; ita volunt aliqui dicere.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that in truth [revera] composition according to the reckoning of the thing to be understood [intelligendi] is more first than mutation; but since negations hold themselves contrariwise [e contrario] to affirmation, hence it is, that immutability is more first; thus do some want to say it.

Potest tamen aliter dici et melius, quod est prius et notius *nobis*, et prius *simpliciter*;[5] et quia simplicitas est maxime nobis occulta propter hoc, quod simplex, in quantum simplex, habet rationem principii; et nos venimus a cognitione posterioris in cognitionem prioris: ideo prius agit de immutabilitate quam simplicitate.

However it can be said in another manner and better, that He is more first and more known *to us*, and more first *simply*;[5] and because simplicity is most hidden to us on account of this, that the simple, inasmuch as (it is) simple, has a reckoning of principle; and we come from cognition of the posterior unto the cognition of the prior: for that reason he deals with immutability in

a manner more first than simplicity.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in littera: *Eademque proprie ac vere simplex, quia nec habet compositionem partium* etc. Videtur enim superflua dicere, quia simplex est cuius pars non est, sicut compositum dicitur quod habet partes.

Doubt II

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says in the text: *And the same (is) properly and truly simple, because it has neither composition of parts* etc.. For it seems superfluous to say, that the simple is that of which there is not a part, just as the composite is said (to be) that which has parts.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister notificat hic simplex, secundum quod est Dei proprium; et ita opponitur *compositioni* et *multiplicitati*. Quantum / ergo ad privationem *compositionis*.

I **respond**: It must be said, that Master (Peter) here makes known the simple, according to which it is proper to God; and thus it is opposed to *composition* and to *multiplicity*. Therefore / as much as regards the privation of *composition*

[3] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *haec*. Mox post *simplicitas* cod. V *erit* loco *est*.
[4] Aristot., I. Poster. c. 10. (c. 13): Similiter autem et, si affirmatio est causa ipsius esse, et negatio ipsius non esse. — Hic codd. inter se non conveniunt; alii ut H K V Y etc. cum ed. 1 habent *est*, quod alii ut A F G I T etc. omittunt et cuius loco Vat. non bene habet *sit*; cod. V voci *negationis* premittit *erit*. Paulo infra post *simplicitatis* codd. H Y addunt *quam immutabilitatis*.
[5] Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2; — in qua propositione fide mss. et ed. 1 adieciumus primum *et*, ac mox post *prius* expunximus repetitum *notius*.

[3] The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has *this* [haec] in place of *here the* [hic]. Then after *simplicity* codex V has *will be* [erit] in place of *is* [est].
[4] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 10 (ch. 13): Moreover similarly also, if affirmation is the cause its own being [ipsius esse], and negation of its own being [ipsius esse]. — Here the codices do not agree among themselves; some as H K V Y etc. together with editoin 1 have the *is* [est], which the others as A F G I T etc. omit and in place of which the Vatican text does not well have *may be* [sit]; codex V prefixes to the word *cause of negation* [causa negationis] a *will be* [erit]. A little below this after *of simplicity* [simplicitatis] codices H and Y add *than of immutability* [quam immutabilitatis].
[5] Aristotle. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 2; in which proposition, trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have inserted first an *and* [et], and then after the second *more first* we have expunged the repeated *more known* [notius].

ergo ad privationem *compositionis*, dicit, quod non habet multitudinem partium; quantum vero ad privationem *multiplicitatis extraneae*, dicit quod non habet varietatem accidentium; quantum vero ad privationem *multiplicitatis intrinsecae*, dicit quod non habet varietatem formarum, ut generis, speciei et differentiae; et hoc modo simplex est simplex vero et proprie, quod solius Dei

Therefore / as much as regards privation of *composition*, he says, that He does not have a multitude of parts; but as much as regards privation of *extraneous multiplicity*, he says that He does not have a variety of accidents; but as much as regards privation of *intrinsic multiplicity*, he says that He does not have a variety of forms, as of genus, species and difference; and in this manner

est.[1]

the simple is the simple truly and properly, which does belong to God alone.[1]

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de ista ratione Augustini: *Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem* etc. Probat enim, animam esse compositam propter multitudinem proprietatum. *Sed contra*: nulla substantia componitur ex proprietatibus neque per se neque cum alio: ergo ex hoc non probatur, quod anima sit composita.

DOUBT III

Likewise is asked concerning that reason of (St.) Augustine: *For since it is one (thing) to be artificial, another inert* etc.. For he proves, that the soul is composite on account of the multitude of (its) properties. *But on the contrary*: no substance is composed out of properties neither through itself nor with another: therefore from this it is not proved, that the soul is composite.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Augustinus hoc non probat nisi a posteriori. Compositio enim accidentis ad subiectum et diversitas necessario praesupponit aliam compositionem, quia, ut dicit Boethius,[2] «quod est pure forma subiectum esse non potest »: ergo ad hoc, quod aliquid sit subiectum accidentium plurium, oportet in illo praeexistere compositionem intrinsecam; sed anima capit in se multitudinem accidentium: et ideo necessario infertur a posteriori, quod ipsa sit composita, licet non ex accidentibus.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that (St.) Augustine does not prove this except a posteriori. For the composition of an accident regards [ad] a subject and (their) diversity necessarily presupposes another composition, because, as Boethius says,[2] « that which is purely form cannot be a subject »: therefore for this, that something be a subject of more accidents, it is proper that an intrinsic composition pre-exist in it; but the soul captures in itself a multitude of accidents: and for that reason there is necessarily inferred a posteriori, that it itself is composite, though not out of accidents.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum* etc. Videtur enim male dicere; quia a quocumque removetur superius, et inferius:[3] ergo si non habet qualitatem, nec bonitatem. *Si tu dicas*, quod bonitas illa non est species qualitatis, quaeritur, quare non similiter dicitur in divinis qualitas divina, sicut bonitas divina?

DOUBT IV

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *the One Good without quality, the One Great without quantity* etc.. For it seems that he speaks badly; because from whomsoever a superior is removed, (is) also an inferior:[3] therefore if He does not have quality, neither (does He) goodness. *If you say*, that that Goodness is not a species of quality, it is asked, why is divine quality not similarly meant in divine (things), just as divine goodness (is)?

RESPONDEO: Quidam volunt dicere, quod nomen *generis* non transfertur ad divina, tum quia non dicit rei complementum, sicut species; tum quia significat in concretione ad subiectum et in dependentia.[4] Nomina autem *specialia* connotant effectum in creatura; et ideo dicitur *sine qualitate bonus*.

I RESPOND: Certain ones want to say, that the noun for *genus* is not transferred to divine (things), both because it does not mean a complement of a thing, just as species (does); and because it signifies in the concretion to a subject and in dependence.[4] But *special* nouns connote the effect in the creature; and for that reason

there is said *the One Good without quality*.

Sed si quis velit[5] inspicere, invenit hoc non habere veritatem. Si ergo quaeritur: quomodo differt in Deo magnitudo et bonitas? dicendum, quod magnitudo significat divinam essentiam per modum quantitatis, bonitas per modum qualitatis: ergo isti modi cadunt in Deo.[6] Et *iterum*, si quaeratur: *qualis* est Deus? respondetur: bonus et magnus.

But if one wants to look into (this matter),[5] he finds that this does not have truth. Therefore if there is asked: how does magnitude and goodness differ in God? it must be said, that magnitude signifies the Divine Essence through the manner of quantity, goodness through the manner of quality: therefore those manners do occur [cadunt] in God.[6] And *again*, if there is asked: *what kind* is God? there is responded: Good and Great.

Et ideo dicendum, quod nomina generum in divinis reperiuntur, sed non prout habent rationem generis, quia Deus in nullo genere est; et ad hoc significandum removet Augustinus[7] nomina novem generum, in quantum sunt genera.

And for that reason it must be said, that nouns for genera are discovered among the divine, but not insofar as they have a reckoning of a genus, because God is in no genus; and to signify this (St.) Augustine[7] removes the names of the nine genera, inasmuch as they are genera.

Dub. V.

Doubt V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Si tamen est dignum, ut Deus dicatur substare*. Videtur enim satis dignum, quia summa nobilitas est per se subsistere.

Likewise is asked concerning this which is said: *if, however, it is worthy, that God be said to be as a substance* [substare]. For it seems sufficiently worthy, that the Most High Nobility is One that subsists through itself.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplex est proprietas ipsius substantiae, scilicet *per se stare* et *alii subesse*; primum est perfectionis, secundum imperfectionis; et ideo ratione primae dicitur digne,[8] non ratione secundae.

I respond: It must be said, that twofold is the property of substance itself, namely, *to stand through itself* and *to be beneath another*; the first belongs to perfection, the second to imperfection; and for that reason by a reckoning of the first, (substance) is said in a worthy manner,[8] not by a reckoning of the second.

Dub. VI.

Doubt VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: *Non ex compositis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit* etc.; quae differentia est inter illas differentias? Quodsi[9] nulla est, videtur facere inculcationem verborum.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St.) Hilary says: *Not out of composites does God, who is Life, subsist* etc.; what difference is there between those differences? Because if[9] there is none, the expression seems to be forced [videtur facere inculcationem verborum].

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quidam volunt,[10]

I respond: It must be said, that certain ones want,[10]

[1] Vide hic, q. 2.
[2] Libr. de Trin. c. 2: Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum.
[3] Cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 2. et Petr. Hispan., Summula tract. de Syllog. topico.
[4] Mendum Vat. *substantiam et indipendentiam* correximus auctoritate mss. et ed. 1; cod. dd *in concretione sicut ad subiectum et dependentiam*. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 3 hoc explicat dicens: Quantitas habet propriam rationem in comparatione ad subiectum; est enim quantitas mensura substantiae, qualitas dispositio substantiae; unde eadem ratione removentur a divina praedicatione secundum rationem generis, sicut removebantur per rationem accidentis.
[5] Cod. V hic addit *haec*, et paulo post *illud* loco *hoc*. Mox cod. dd *differat* pro *differt*.
[6] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Deum*. Paulo infra post *bonus* aliqui codd. ut K cc ee ff cum edd. 2, 3 *non* loco *et*, quae lectio, etsi non sit falsa, tamen minus est ad rem, quia in praeposita quaestione terminus *qualis* sumitur sensu largo, quatenus comprehendit omnia Dei attributa.
[7] Lib. V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. — Pro intelligentia huius dubii notandum, quod hic non agitur de quaestione, utrum Deus sit in aliquo genere (de quo S. Docotr iam supra q. 4. egit), sed de translatione nominum genericorum ad divina sive etiam de modo significandi, quem haec nomina respectu Dei habent. Opinionis hic primo loco positae ratoines ponunt S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 3, et clarius de Potentia q. 7. a. 4. ad 2; — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 4. ad 2; — B. Albert., hic a. 31; — Petrus a Tar., hic q. 5; aliique. Secunda opinio est S. Doctoris, quae consistit in duobus, scil. 1.° in eo, quod nomina generum *in quantum sunt genera* non transferantur; et hoc probant rationes pro prima opinione adductae; 2.° in eo, quod praedicta nomina *aliquo modo* transferantur, si nempe accipiuntur communiter sive *improprie* (cfr. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.), et hoc non negant auctores pro prima sententia citati. Ex quo patet, S. Doctorem impugnare eos qui contendunt, dicta nomina *nullo modo* transferri posse.
[8] Ed. 1 addit *substantia*. — De duplici hac substantiae proprietate vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2.
[9] Vat. contra plurimos codd. *Quia si*, et mox contra vetustiores mss. et ed. 1 omittit *verborum*.
[10] Postulantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *volunt* loco *voluerunt*. Dein cod. dd addit *dicere*.

[1] See this distinction, q. 2.
[2] The book On the Trinity, ch. 2: However the form, which is without matter, could not be a subject.
[3] Cf. Aristotle, Topics. Bk. IV, ch. 2, and Peter of Spain, Summula, tract "On the Topic of the Syllogism".
[4] The error of the Vatican text, *substance and independence* [substantia et indipendentia], we have corrected on the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1; codex dd reads *in concretion just as regards a subject and dependence* [in concretione sicut ad subiectum et dependentiam]. — St. Thomas, here in q. 4, a. 3, explains this saying: Quantity has its own reckoning in comparison to a subject; for quantity is the measure of the substance, quality the disposition of the substance; whence by the same reckoning they are removed from divine predication according to the reckoning of a genus, just as they were removed through the reckoning of an accident.
[5] Codex V here adds *this (matter)* [haec], and a little after this *that* [illud] in place of *this* [hoc]. Next codex dd has the subjunctive *differ* [differat] in place of the indicative *differs* [differt].
[6] The Vatican text, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has *unto God* [in Deum]. A little below this after *Good* [bonus] some codices as K cc ee and ff together with editions 2 and 3 have *not* [non] in place of *and* [et], which reading, even if it isn ot false, however, is less to the point, because in the previous question the term *what kind* [qualis] is taken in a broad sense, to the extent that it comprehends all the attributes of God.
[7] On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 8, n. 9. — For an understanding of this dubium it must be noted, that here one does not deal with the question, whether God is in any genus, with which the Seraphic Doctor has already dealt above in q. 4, but with the translation of generic nouns to divine (things) or even with the manner of signifying, that which these nouns have in respect of God. Here the reasons posited in the first place for this opinion are put by St. Thomas, here in q. 4, a. 3, and more clearly in On Potency, q. 7, a. 4, at n. 2; Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4, at n. 2; — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 31; — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 5; and others. The second opinion belongs to the Seraphic Doctor, which consists in two parts, that is, first in this, that the names of genera *inasmuch as they are genera* are not transferred; and the reasons adduced for the first opinion prove this; second in this, that the aforesaid names *in some manner* are transferred, if namely they are accepted commonly or *improperly*, cf. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2, and this the authors cited on behalf of the first sentence do not deny. From which it is clear, that the Seraphic Doctor does impugn those who contend, that the said nouns can *in no manner* be transferred.
[8] Edition 1 adds *substance*. — On this twofold property of substance see below d. 23, a. 1, q. 2.
[9] The Vatican text, contrary to very many codices, reads *Because if* [Quia si], and next, contrary to the older manuscripts and edition 1, it omits *verborum*.

[10] Having searched the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *want* [volunt] in place of *wanted* [voluerunt]. Then codex dd adds *to say* [dicere].

p. 176

quod per illa quatuor excludantur quatuor *genera compositionum*. *Prima* enim est essentiae ex principiis essentialibus, ratione cuius dicitur, quod *Deus non est ex compositis*, id est simul positis. *Secunda* est substantiae ex principiis naturalibus, quae sunt materia et forma; ratione huius dicitur: *neque ex infirmis*, quia materia subiecta est privationi, quae facit formam esse instabilem[1] et infirmam, et similiter materiam; infirma enim dicuntur instabilia. *Tertia* est compositio mixti ex miscibilibus, ratione cuius dicit: *neque ex obscuris*, quia ubi mixtio, ibi quaedam formarum confusio, et ita obscuratio. *Quarta* est compositio animali ex partibus disparibus, ex anima videlicet et corpore; ratione huius dicit: *neque ex partibus disparibus, quia ipse est spiritus*.

that through those four there be excluded the four *genera of compositions*. For the *first* is of essence out of essential principles, for which reason it is said, that *God is not out of composites*, that is (things) simultaneously posited. The *second* is of substance out of the natural principles, which are matter and form; for this reason there is said: *neither out of (things) infirm*, because matter is subject to a privation, which causes form to be unstable[1] and infirm, and similarly matter; for infirm (things) are said (to be) instable. The *third* is composition of the mixed out of mixables, for which reason he says: *neither out of (things) obscure*, because where (there is) mixing, there (is) a certain confusion of forms, and thus an obscuring [obscuratio]. The *fourth* is the composition of an animal out of disparate parts, namely out of soul and body; for which reason he says: *neither out of disparate parts, because He Himself is a spirit*.

Aliter tamen potest dicit, quod excludit eandem compositionem ratione *diversarum conditionum*. Ad hoc enim quod aliqua[2] principia constituant aliquid, oportet, quod principia sint *differentia*, sint *dependentia*, sint *imperfecta*, sint etiam *difformia*. Si enim essent omnino conformia et perfecta, non possent aliquid constituere, quia ex duobus entibus actu nihil fit.[3] Quia ergo *differentia*, ideo sunt composita, quasi cum aliis posita; quia *dependentia*, ideo infirma;[4] quia *imperfecta*, ideo obscura; quia *dissimilia*, ideo disparia. Deus autem non potest esse ex differentibus[5] et diversis, quia est vita per essentiam; non potest esse ex dependentibus et infirmis, quia virtus per essentiam; non potest esse ex imperfectis et obscuris, quia lux est; similiter non potest esse ex disparibus et dissimilibus, quia spiritus per essentiam. Summa ergo

However it can be said in another manner, that he does exclude composition by a reckoning of *diverse conditions*. For, for this, that some[2] principles constitute something, it is proper, that the principles be *different*, be *dependent*, be *imperfect*, be also 'differing in form' [difformia]. For if they were entirely conformal and perfect, they could not constitute anything, because out of two beings in act nothing comes to be.[3] Therefore because (they are) *different*, for that reason they are composite, as if with others posited; because (they are) *dependent*, for that reason (they are) infirm;[4] because *imperfect*, for that reason obscure; because *dissimilar*, for that reason disparate. But God cannot be out of (things) different[5] and diverse, because He is Life through (His) essence; He cannot be out of (things) dependent and infirm, because (He

actualitas, summa *potestas*, summa *claritas*, summa *spiritualitas* non permittunt in Deo esse aliquam compositionem. Unde ex his quatuor conditionibus quatuor rationes eliciuntur probantes Deum[6] simplicissimum.

is) Virtue through (His) essence; He cannot be out of (things) imperfect and obscure, because He is Light; similarly He cannot be out of (things) disparate and dissimilar, because (He is) Spirit through (His) Essence. Therefore a most high *Actuality*, a most high *Power*, a most high *Clarity*, (and) a Most high *Spirituality* do not permit that in God there is any composition. Whence out of these four conditions four reasons are elicited proving that God[6] (is) the Most Simple.

---

[1] Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *mutabilem* pro *esse instabilem*.
[2] Supplevimus *aliqua* ex 1 ed. et omnibus mss., quorum multi tamen mox omittunt *aliquid*.
[3] Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.): Duo namque sic actu, nunquam sunt unum actu . . . nam actus separat.
[4] Multi codd. cum ed. 1 *informia*, sed falso.
[5] Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *differentibus et* pro quo cod. cc et edd. 2, 3, 6 habet *dependentibus*. Paulo post Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem mss. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, omittit *dependentibus et*.
[6] Aliqui codd. ut K V Y ee addunt *esse*. — Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 33. — S. Thom. et Richard, hic circa lit.

[1] The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing, however, with the other codices and edition 1, have *mutable* [mutabilem] in place of *to be unstable* [esse instabilem].
[2] We have supplied *some* [aliqua] from the first edition and all the manuscripts, many of which, however, next omit *something* [aliquid].
[3] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk VII, text 49 (Bk. VI, ch. 13): For with two thus in act, they are never one in act . . . for act separates (them).
[4] Many codices together with edition 1 read *informal* [informia], but falsely.
[5] The more ancient codices together with edition 1 omit *different and* [differentibus et], in place of which codex cc and editions 2, 3 and 6 have *dependent* [dependentibus]. A little after this the Vatican text together with codex cc, but disagreeing with the other manuscripts and edition 1, omit *dependent and* [dependentibus et].
[6] Some codices as K V Y and ee add *is* [esse]. — Cf. Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 33. — St. Thomas and Richard (of Middletown), here on the text.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.